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INTRODUCTION
What is the ideal structure for appellate review? Without
providing a definitive answer to the question, commentators have
suggested several factors that may improve the process, and thus
perhaps the accuracy, of appellate review. First, it is said that panels
of judges are preferable to review by a single judge. Second, expertise
in the relevant area of law is a benefit. Third, other indicia of
lawfinding ability—such as the ability of lawyers and judges to focus
on legal issues without the distraction of factual conflicts and the
amenability of judges’ schedules to careful contemplation and
reflection—contribute to the quality of appellate review. Fourth, a
court’s adherence to traditional notions of appellate hierarchy, as
exemplified by following its earlier precedents, has been deemed to
produce better results. Finally, it is said that the independence of
appellate judges—that is, the extent to which job features such as life
tenure and a guaranteed salary tend to insulate judges from pressures
to decide cases or issues one way or another—is of value.
In this Article, we endeavor to evaluate empirically the relative
quality of appellate review. To do this, we rely upon data obtained
from the appellate review of bankruptcy matters. The current federal
bankruptcy appellate structure provides an excellent setting in which
to study appellate review because it offers litigants two paths for
obtaining appellate review. First, after the bankruptcy judge issues a
ruling, litigants may have the district court—in the person of a single
district judge—review that ruling. Alternatively, the parties may
agree (in circuits that have them) to have the bankruptcy judge’s
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ruling reviewed by a panel of bankruptcy judges—a so-called
“bankruptcy appellate panel” or “BAP.” Further appeal in both cases—
whether from the district court or the bankruptcy appellate panel—
lies with the proper federal circuit court of appeals.
We have collected data on affirmance rates in and citation
rates to appellate bankruptcy opinions. Analyses of the data
generally—and analyses of the citation data in particular—support
the notion that BAP decisions in our study are perceived to be of
greater quality than are district court decisions. First, we find support
for the proposition that courts of appeals are more likely to uphold
upon review the conclusions of BAPs than district courts. Second, BAP
decisions are, with statistical significance, cited more frequently by
bankruptcy courts, BAPs, federal courts of appeals, and courts in
other circuits than are district court decisions. Only district courts are
not more likely to cite BAP decisions than decisions rendered by
district courts.
Our findings will be of interest both to theoreticians and
policymakers. If courts try to reach “correct” decisions, then our
findings generally buttress the various theories about how to structure
appellate tribunals so as to maximize the quality of appellate review.
This, in turn, should guide policymakers in designing appellate
tribunals and appellate structures in general. In particular,
multimember tribunals that adhere to traditional notions of appellate
hierarchy and that have subject-matter expertise in the area of the
appeal appear to be desirable. And, even if judges do not strive to
resolve issues and cases “correctly,” our findings still seem to support
the notion that judges perceive that appellate tribunals that have
certain attributes will reach correct conclusions. In this sense, our
findings show the persuasive strength of the theoreticians’ story, or at
least judges’ perceptions of the strength of that story.
The Article proceeds in the following manner. Part I provides
an overview of the theoretical literature discussing the quality of
appellate review. Part II discusses the means by which we undertook
to evaluate the quality of appellate review: Part II.A presents the legal
setting of appeals of core bankruptcy proceedings, and Part II.B sets
out the hypotheses we sought to test. Part III explains how we tested
the hypotheses. Part III.A details the data we compiled and the
essential features of those data. The next two subparts present the
findings of our statistical analyses, with Part III.B explicating the
bivariate descriptive statistics and Part III.C presenting the results of
regression tests we conducted. Part III.D interprets these results and
considers the implications of our findings.
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I. EVALUATING THE QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Assembling an exhaustive list of the ideal elements of appellate
review would present no small task. However, the academic literature
does suggest several attributes that will tend to contribute to better
appellate review.
First, commentators laud the use of panels of judges, rather
than single judges, to hear appeals. There are two justifications for
this. First, to the extent that there is an objectively “correct” answer to
a question of law posed on appeal, and to the extent that there is a
greater than 50% chance that each appellate judge will reach that
“correct” answer, the Condorcet Jury Theorem instructs that a panel
of judges will more likely reach the “correct” answer than will a single
appellate judge.1 Second, even to the extent that one might question
the validity of the assumptions underlying the applicability of the
Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate review,2 there is
an argument that the collegial nature of multimember appellate
panels contributes to reflective decisionmaking and thus to the quality
of appellate review.3
A second factor that strengthens the quality of appellate review
is expertise of the appellate decisionmaking body in the subject matter
of the appeals it hears.4 Thus, for example, Congress created the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit with an eye to

1.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, Resuscitating Deference to Lower Federal Court Judges’
Interpretations of State Law, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 975, 1022–23 (2004) (describing the Condorcet
Jury Theorem).
2.
See Jonathan Remy Nash, A Context-Sensitive Voting Protocol Paradigm for
Multimember Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 75, 112–13 & 112 nn.130–31 (2003) (questioning the
applicability of the Condorcet Jury Theorem in the context of appellate judicial decisionmaking).
3.
See, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, The Effects of Collegiality on Judicial Decisionmaking, 151
U. PA. L. REV. 1639, 1649 (2003) (arguing that collegiality contributes to sound decisionmaking
that focuses on the legal issues at hand); Lewis A. Kornhauser & Lawrence G. Sager, Unpacking
the Court, 96 YALE L.J. 82, 100–02 (1986). But see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997) (finding empirical evidence that
judges on an appellate panel of the same political party are more likely to vote ideologically);
Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade & Lisa Michelle Ellman, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REV. 301, 316–25 (2004) (finding some
evidence of ideological voting on federal courts of appeals).
4.
See Erwin Chemerinsky, Decision-Makers: In Defense of Courts, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 109,
115 (1997) (“Specialization offers two major advantages: expertise and uniformity.”). For an
argument that it might benefit the legal system to have some judges with expertise in areas
other than law, see Adrian Vermeule, Should We Have Lay Justices?, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1569,
1587–98 (2007).
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creating an appellate body with the expertise to deal effectively with
the complex area of patent law.5
Third, courts and commentators identify general “lawfinding
ability”—as distinct from expertise in particular areas of law—as a
virtue for appellate review.6 While the Supreme Court has
characterized the presence of multijudge panels as “[p]erhaps most
important” in assessing lawfinding ability,7 it has also indicated other
factors that tend to enhance lawfinding ability in the appellate
setting. Specifically, lawfinding ability is greater when (i) the judges
have schedules that allow time for reflection,8 (ii) the judges resolve
legal issues once the factual record is fully developed,9 and (iii) the
attorneys may focus on the relevant legal issues without the
distraction of trial advocacy.10
A fourth factor that tends to be associated with the quality of
appellate review is the extent to which an appellate court conforms to
traditional appellate hierarchy.11 Courts in the United States are
organized according to a standard hierarchy: trial courts decide cases
in the first instance, with a first appeal as of right to an intermediate
appellate court and a second appeal to a high court at the discretion of

5.
See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized
Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) (citing predictability and efficiency as reasons for creating a
specialized patent court to relieve the burden of technical patent cases on generalist judges); R.
Polk Wagner & Lee Petherbridge, Is the Federal Circuit Succeeding? An Empirical Assessment of
Judicial Performance, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1105, 1114–17 (2004) (giving an account of the
establishment of the Federal Circuit’s exclusive appellate jurisdiction over patent law).
6.
See Nash, supra note 1, at 1022.
7.
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 232 (1991).
8.
Id. at 231 (noting, with a negative connotation from the perspective of lawfinding
ability, that district judges “preside alone over fast-paced trials”).
9.
Id. at 232.
10. Id. at 231–32.
11. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International Review of
National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029, 2047 (2004) (suggesting that appellate review and
appellate hierarchy are integrally related by noting that “the various characteristics and
functions of appellate review . . . suggest that some gradation of judicial authority is central to
the nature of appellate review,” and that “[a]n appellate system of review . . . is one defined by
hierarchy”); John A. Ferejohn & Larry D. Kramer, Independent Judges, Dependent Judiciary:
Institutionalizing Judicial Restraint, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962, 998 (2002) (“[T]he development of an
appellate hierarchy with collegial courts at the higher levels and stringent rules of vertical stare
decisis operates structurally to ensure that no individual judge can, by his or her actions alone,
inflict too much damage on the judiciary by making aberrant or overly ambitious decisions.”);
Mortimer N. S. Sellers, The Doctrine of Precedent in the United States of America, 54 AM. J.
COMP. L. 67, 68 (2006) (“The essence of the American system of precedent as experienced in
practice resides in the great authority and hierarchical arrangement of the courts.”). But cf.
Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 387–88 (2007) (arguing that the
common principal-agent model for analyzing lower court efforts to fulfill appellate court
mandates ignores the allocation of discretion to lower courts).
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that high court.12 Within that hierarchy are rules of precedent that,
while not absolute, create barriers against courts overruling earlier
cases. As a general matter, under so-called horizontal stare decisis,
high courts and intermediate appellate courts will follow their own
earlier precedents.13 Further, vertical stare decisis binds inferior
courts generally to the precedents issued by superior courts within the
hierarchy.14
It is true that court systems need not have the features of
appellate hierarchy and stare decisis to function, nor indeed to
function well.15 Commentators debate whether Congress can
statutorily alter or abrogate the traditional rules of stare decisis, as
12. See, e.g., Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team:
Hierarchy and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1607–08 (1995)
(elucidating the traditional appellate hierarchy).
13. Absent en banc review, courts of appeals are bound by prior decisions issued by the
court (independent of panel composition). E.g., United States v. Myers, 200 F.3d 715, 720 (10th
Cir. 2000).
In general, horizontal stare decisis does not extend beyond the court that issued an opinion to
sibling courts of the same hierarchical level. While intermediate appellate courts will follow
decisions issued by earlier panels of the same court—notwithstanding that the composition of the
judges on the panels may vary—intermediate appellate courts generally are under no
precedential obligation to follow decisions issued by sibling intermediate appellate courts of
similar hierarchical rank. Thus, for example, a Ninth Circuit panel may find First Circuit
precedent to be persuasive and choose to follow it, but stare decisis does not demand that the
Ninth Circuit so act; rather, stare decisis leaves the Ninth Circuit free to disagree with and to
disregard the First Circuit precedent. See, e.g., Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 824–25 (1994). Also, the rule of
horizontal precedent does not extend to trial courts, as discussed below. See Amy Coney Barrett,
Stare Decisis and Due Process, 74 U. COLO. L. REV. 1011, 1015 (2003); Caminker, supra, at 825
(“[A] district court judge may ignore the decisions of ‘foreign’ courts of appeals as well as other
district court judges, even within the same district.” (footnote omitted)); Kornhauser, supra note
12, at 1609. But see Daniel J. Bussel, Power, Authority, and Precedent in Interpreting the
Bankruptcy Code, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1063, 1095 (1994) (noting a “long tradition” of district judges
deviating from prior precedent in the same district only in extraordinary circumstances); infra
note 71 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 111 (“[C]ourts generally issue written decisions
that, when published, have precedential effect on future rulings involving different parties.”);
Susan B. Haire, Stefanie Lindquist & Donald R. Songer, Appellate Court Supervision in the
Federal Judiciary: A Hierarchical Perspective, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 143, 145 (2003) (“Appellate
oversight in the lower tiers of the federal judicial hierarchy . . . provides a process through which
circuit judges are expected to promote legal rules that will guide decision making in subsequent
cases.”); Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1609.
15. For example, civil law systems do not rely upon as stringent a hierarchy, or upon rules
of precedent as stringent. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 826; Kornhauser, supra note 12,
at 1608; Thomas Lundmark, Interpreting Precedents: A Comparative Study, 46 AM. J. COMP. L.
211, 214 (1998) (reviewing INTERPRETIVE PRECEDENTS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (D. Neil
MacCormick & Robert S. Summers eds., 1997)) (“One of the classic differences between civil-law
and common-law jurisdictions is that the former . . . do not recognize judicial precedent as an
independent source of law.” (footnote omitted)). For an exposition, and critique, of the necessity
and desirability of stare decisis, see Caminker, supra note 13, at 865–67.
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well as the normative question of whether it should.16 Nonetheless,
whether it is constitutionally mandated or normatively desirable, the
assumption underlying the dominant U.S. judicial structure is that
horizontal and vertical stare decisis provide precedential power to
decisions by appellate courts. Assuming that judges seek to arrive at
correct outcomes,17 these standard rules of precedent presumably
increase the quality of appellate review. It stands to reason that a
court that knows that its opinions will bind itself, and possibly bind
lower courts, will consider more carefully its reasoning before issuing
judgments and opinions that announce new rules of law.18 Relatedly, a
focus on cases that raise novel legal questions should allow appellate
courts to conserve judicial resources, apply those resources in cases in
which they are truly needed, and thus to reach correct answers more
frequently.19
16. Compare, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 828–34 (arguing that the constitutional case
for the binding nature of Supreme Court precedent on lower federal courts is “quite powerful”),
and Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional
Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 577–85 (2001) (arguing in favor of the constitutional status
of stare decisis), with John Harrison, The Power of Congress over the Rules of Precedent, 50 DUKE
L.J. 503, 513 (2000) (arguing to the contrary), Thomas Healy, Stare Decisis as a Constitutional
Requirement, 104 W. VA. L. REV. 43, 92 (2001) (same), Gary Lawson, Controlling Precedent:
Congressional Regulation of Judicial Decision-Making, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 191, 204–07 (2001)
(same), and Michael Stokes Paulsen, Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove
the Precedential Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1546–47 (2000) (same).
17. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1606 (taking as a baseline assumption in developing
economic theory of stare decisis that “the ‘judicial team’ seeks to answer the expected number of
‘correct’ answers subject to its resource constraint”); cf. Owen M. Fiss, Objectivity and
Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739, 746–47 (1982) (discussing how judges belong to an
“interpretive community” that subscribes to the rule of law).
Even if goals other than arriving at the correct outcome motivate judges, see, e.g., Erin
O’Hara, Social Constraint or Implicit Collusion? Toward a Game Theoretic Analysis of Stare
Decisis, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 736, 738–42 (1993) (arguing that judges’ self-interest—including
judges’ interest in expanding their influence—explains the development of horizontal stare
decisis); infra notes 100–102 and accompanying text, the fact remains that, to the extent that the
U.S. judicial system substantially relies on the traditional hierarchical form and rules, the extent
to which a court comports with that norm will increase the perception that it is reaching correct
decisions.
18. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1623 (“In a completely decentralized system each
judge would have to attend to the caseload of every other judge in order to identify appropriate
cases for review; in a hierarchical system, only the appellate judges need have a systemic
perspective on caseload.”); cf. id. at 1620 (noting that, absent horizontal precedent, “each judge is
more likely to give each case intensive consideration” (emphasis added)); id. at 1624 (arguing in
favor of “strict vertical precedent because the hierarchical structure creates a division of labor
between levels of the hierarchy”); id. at 1625–27 (arguing in favor of horizontal precedent at the
appellate, but not the trial, level).
19. See Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 1622–24; Caminker, supra note 13, at 839–43. Of
course, a cost in such a system is that the first court may resolve the legal question incorrectly,
and then bind future courts to that rule. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 736 n.3 (identifying the
“primary social cost of stare decisis” as “the entrenchment of bad decisions”); see also Lewis A.
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A fifth factor that many commentators identify as an
ingredient of judicial quality is judicial independence.20 It is said that
judges who enjoy greater independence are less likely to be swayed by
irrelevant, nonjudicial concerns. The American Founding Fathers
subscribed to this view,21 and accordingly vested Article III judges
with presumptive life tenure and the guarantee of nonreduction in
salary.22
II. INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE AND
THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE REVIEW
At its essence, an appeal involves a claim that a trial court
committed some form of error—for example, failure to follow proper
procedure or improper application of the law. Accordingly, we might
say that one of the primary functions of an appellate court, if not the
principal function, is to ascertain whether the alleged error truly
occurred. As we have already discussed, theorists have posited various
attributes that improve the quality of appellate review. While
plausible that some of these factors may contribute more than others
to improving the quality of appellate review, it seems reasonable to
conclude that, on balance, as between two different appellate
tribunals, the one that has more of the theorized features of quality
appellate review will perform the appellate function better.
Kornhauser, An Economic Perspective on Stare Decisis, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 63, 67–73 (1989)
(discussing reliance by a court on earlier decisions by that court, even if wrongly decided, as an
optimization problem and as varying depending upon institutional structure).
There are other social benefits that rules of stare decisis provide—certainty, predictability,
fairness, and consistency. See Caminker, supra note 13, at 843–56 (discussing the desire to avoid
“delayed justice,” the greater decisionmaking proficiency of superior courts, and uniform
interpretation and application of law as consequentialist justifications for stare decisis);
Kornhauser, supra note 12, at 74–78 (discussing fairness, competence, and certainty as
justifications for stare decisis). These benefits, however, are not the result of the courts
necessarily reaching correct conclusions. Indeed, these benefits would inhere if courts uniformly
reached bad decisions. See Kornhauser & Sager, supra note 3, at 105 (contrasting consistency,
soundness, and coherence).
20. See, e.g., Daniel Berkowitz & Karen Clay, The Effect of Judicial Independence on
Courts: Evidence from the American States, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 399, 422–24 (2006) (finding a strong
correlation between judicial independence and court quality); Jonathan Remy Nash, Prejudging
Judges, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 2168, 2171 (2006) (characterizing judicial independence and judicial
accountability as “competing demands upon the judiciary”). But see Daniel M. Klerman, Legal
Infrastructure, Judicial Independence, and Economic Development 1 (Univ. S. Cal. Law Sch.
Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. C06-1, 2006), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=877490 (“There is some evidence that judicial independence is
associated with economic growth, but the evidence is mixed and causation is unclear.”).
21. See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 78, 79, 81 (Alexander Hamilton); id. NOS. 47, 48, 51 (James
Madison).
22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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The two-tiered system of bankruptcy appeals is an excellent
field for an empirical investigation of how alternative appellate
structures may affect the quality of appellate review. The current
appellate structure provides for appeals of bankruptcy court decisions
in “core” bankruptcy proceedings to be heard by one of two appellate
tribunals: federal district courts or federal bankruptcy appellate
panels (commonly referred to as “BAPs”). Based on the criteria we
identified above in Part I, we conclude that the BAP is the stronger of
the two appellate courts—that is, better equipped to carry out the
principal function of identifying alleged error. We investigate this
hypothesis through the study of appeals in core bankruptcy
proceedings. We seek to unearth evidence that will inform scholarly
inquiry into the hallmarks of quality appellate review and that will
illuminate areas warranting further exploration.
This Part sets the backdrop for our empirical study. First, we
describe the bankruptcy judicial structure, with primary emphasis on
the manner in which appeals progress through it. We then discuss our
approach for empirically investigating the theoretical proposition that
BAPs are the stronger of the two appellate courts in performing
appellate function at the first tier of review. We finally develop a
series of hypotheses to test the theory.
A. The Bankruptcy Appellate Process
Unlike any other part of the federal judicial system, the
bankruptcy appeals process routinely involves two levels of
intermediate review. This anomalous state of affairs can be traced to
congressional reform efforts during the 1970s that sought to improve
the quality of the bankruptcy court while simultaneously maintaining
it in a subordinate relationship to the district court.23
Under the predecessor to the current Bankruptcy Code, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898,24 district courts delegated much of their
responsibility over bankruptcy cases to “bankruptcy referees,”
individuals appointed by a panel of district judges for a six-year
term.25 The limited role and status of the referees at the inception of
the Bankruptcy Act expanded over time, which in turn increased the
cadre of full-time judicial officers involved in the administration of

23. See Eric A. Posner, The Political Economy of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 96
MICH. L. REV. 47, 123 (1997) (noting that the “double appeal system was a concession to the
federal judges, a symbol of the subordination of the bankruptcy court to the district court”).
24. See Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978).
25. Posner, supra note 23, at 61–62.
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bankruptcy cases.26 Eventually, the Supreme Court promulgated rules
of bankruptcy procedure in 1973 that redesignated referees as
“bankruptcy judges.”27 This change, however, did not remove the
distinction between bankruptcy judges and Article III judges,
including, for example, “prohibitions against bankruptcy judges using
the elevators, parking lots, and dining rooms reserved for Article III
judges.”28 Moreover, some Article III judges continued to refer to
bankruptcy judges as “referees” in spite of the titular change.29
Sentiments such as these infused their way into the policymaking
debates over bankruptcy reform in the 1970s.
In 1970, Congress established the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to analyze the Bankruptcy Act
and to suggest recommendations for its reform.30 While the original
resolution creating the Commission proposed that the Chief Justice
would appoint two bankruptcy referees as commissioners, strident
opposition—led by, among others, District Judge Edward Weinfeld,
chair of the Judicial Conference’s Committee on the Administration of
the Bankruptcy System—resulted in passage of the resolution without
constraints on whom the Chief Justice could appoint.31 The Chief
Justice did not appoint any bankruptcy referees to the Commission,
instead appointing Judge Weinfeld and District Judge Hubert Will.32
Judge Weinfeld’s efforts resulted in the exclusion of bankruptcy
referees from policymaking discussions on bankruptcy reform within
the organizational framework of both the Commission and the Judicial
Conference.33 That the federal judiciary went to great lengths to
oppose the inclusion of bankruptcy referees in the reform process
highly suggests that Article III judges feared loss of power and
prestige in the event Congress increased the power of bankruptcy

26. See Geraldine Mund, Appointed or Anointed: Judges, Congress and the Passage of the
Bankruptcy Act of 1978: Part One: Outside Looking In, 81 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3–6 (2007).
27. BANKR. R. 901(7) (1973) (repealed 1978).
28. Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief Justice, the
Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (1985). Hearsay
evidence suggests that at least one Article III judge viewed bankruptcy judges as occupying the
professional status equivalent to a janitor. See Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34.
29. Posner, supra note 23, at 61 & n.25; cf. Mund, supra note 26, at 12 n.34 (“As late as
1978, even though Judge James Browning, then chief judge of the Ninth Circuit, specifically
invited five bankruptcy judges to attend the circuit conference, Senior District Judge Lloyd
George (formerly a bankruptcy judge) reports that ‘they wouldn’t call me “judge.” They called me
mister.’ ” (quoting Interview with Lloyd George (Dec. 20, 2004))).
30. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970).
31. Mund, supra note 26, at 7.
32. Id. at 8.
33. Id.
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referees.34 It is this dynamic that underlies the current bankruptcy
judicial structure and the anomaly of double appeals. Only one level of
intermediate appellate review would have been needed had Congress
made today’s bankruptcy judges coequals with district court judges,
but that was not to be the case.
With enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978,35 Congress
effectuated a complete overhaul of the federal bankruptcy system that
had been in place for eighty years. While there were proposals to vest
bankruptcy judges with Article III status,36 Congress ultimately
rejected that notion, a decision supported by most current and former
Article III judges.37 Congress instead decided to establish the
bankruptcy courts as “adjuncts” of the federal district courts.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction was vested statutorily in the district courts,
yet the statute also directed that all of that jurisdiction was to be
exercised by the bankruptcy courts, which were to be staffed by nonArticle III judges.38
The Supreme Court rejected the 1978 Act’s jurisdictional
structure in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co.39 The Court in Marathon held that the 1978 Act violated
Article III by vesting federal judicial power in non-Article III
bankruptcy judges. The decision forced Congress to repair the
constitutional infirmity. Lobbying by Article III judges led Congress
yet again to reject a solution of affording bankruptcy judges Article III
status.40 Instead, Congress simply modified the 1978 structure. The
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984
34. See Posner, supra note 23, at 75.
35. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended
primarily at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–1532 and in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
36. See Countryman, supra note 28, at 7–8.
37. See id. at 8–9; Posner, supra note 23, at 77 (“The federal judges opposed the creation of
more independent bankruptcy courts, because (1) they would lose their appointment power over
bankruptcy judges, and thus one of their main patronage opportunities, and (2) their status
would be diluted through the vast increase in the number of federal judicial positions.”).
Interestingly, as Congress considered various proposals for reorganizing the court structure
of the bankruptcy system in its reform efforts from the 1970s that led to enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code, bankruptcy judges did not seek Article III status. Instead, they lobbied
Congress for appointment by the judicial council, rather than the president, for two reasons:
First, they believed their merit would be properly recognized in a nonpolitical judicial
appointment process; and, second, they feared that sitting judges would lack the political
connections necessary for presidential appointment. See Mund, supra note 26, at 20–21, 24–25,
29. For a political economic analysis of the 1978 Act’s treatment of bankruptcy judges, see
Posner, supra note 23, at 74–94.
38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b), (c) (Supp. II 1978), invalidated by N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
39. 458 U.S. at 87.
40. Countryman, supra note 28, at 31.
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statutorily established the bankruptcy judges, who are appointed by
the courts of appeals,41 as “unit[s]” of the district courts.42 Thus,
parties technically should file bankruptcy cases in federal district
court. However, the Act authorizes each district court to “refer” “any
or all cases” or “proceedings” to the bankruptcy judges.43 District
courts in turn have implemented “standing orders” to refer
bankruptcy cases in the first instance to the bankruptcy courts.44
In determining the scope of the bankruptcy judge’s authority to
resolve a dispute within a bankruptcy case,45 it is necessary to
categorize the proceeding as core or non-core. Absent the consent of all
parties, bankruptcy judges may only issue recommendations for the
resolution of non-core proceedings, with de novo district court review
upon objection by either party.46 Appellate review thereafter lies to the
appropriate federal court of appeals,47 and thence to the Supreme
Court,48 in line with the typical federal appellate hierarchy.
Core proceedings, on the other hand, are those that lie at the
heart of a bankruptcy case.49 Bankruptcy judges are empowered to
41. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
42. Id. § 151 (2000); see also id. § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005) (“Bankruptcy judges shall serve
as judicial officers of the United States district court established under Article III of the
Constitution.”).
43. Id. § 157(a) (2000).
44. 9 AM. JUR. 2D Bankruptcy § 731 (2008); Bussel, supra note 13, at 1066 & n.12.
45. Disputes in bankruptcy cases generally assume one of two forms: (1) an adversary
proceeding, or (2) a contested matter. Adversary proceedings include, for example, a proceeding
to recover money or property; a proceeding to determine the validity, priority, or extent of a lien;
a proceeding to object to or revoke a discharge; and a proceeding to determine the
dischargeability of a debt. FED. R. BANKR. P. 7001. Such proceedings are initiated and advance
much as any other federal lawsuit, insofar as Part VII of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure, which governs such proceedings, virtually incorporates the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (occasionally with modification). See, e.g., id. 7003 (FED. R. CIV. P. 3); id. 7004(a)
(portions of FED. R. CIV. P. 4); id. 7005 (FED. R. CIV. P. 5); id. 7012(b) (FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)–(h));
id. 7013 (FED. R. CIV. P. 13); id. 7014 (FED. R. CIV. P. 14); id. 7056 (FED. R. CIV. P. 56). Disputes
between parties that are not adversary proceedings are called “contested matters,” and they
proceed according to less complex procedures than adversary proceedings—including request for
relief by motion rather than the filing of a complaint. FED. R. BANKR. P. 9014; see also
Khachikyan v. Hahn (In re Khachikyan), 335 B.R. 121, 125 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (“In a
contested matter, there is no summons and complaint, pleading rules are relaxed, counterclaims
and third-party practice do not apply, and much pre-trial procedure is either foreshortened or
dispensed with in the interest of time . . . .”).
46. The Judicial Code describes a non-core proceeding as “a proceeding that is not a core
proceeding but is otherwise related to a case under title 11.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2000 & Supp.
V 2005).
47. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292 (2000).
48. Id. § 1254(1).
49. Section 157(b)(1) of the Judicial Code speaks of “core proceedings arising under title 11,
or arising in a case under title 11.” Id. § 157(b)(1). In turn, section 157(b)(2) lists examples of core
proceedings, which include matters concerning (1) administration of the estate, (2) the allowance
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resolve these cases definitively, in the first instance, with appellate
review to follow.50 Here, however, there may be more than one possible
appellate path.
The statute authorizes the judicial council of each circuit to
establish a “bankruptcy appellate panel”—commonly known as a
“BAP”—comprised of bankruptcy judges from that circuit.51 BAPs are
now constituted—and have been constituted since 1996—in the First,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.52 For a BAP to be
empowered to hear appeals from bankruptcy courts in a given district,
a majority of district judges in the district must vote to authorize it.53
In circuits that have created BAPs and in districts that have
authorized the BAP to hear appeals, the default rule is that, unless a
party elects otherwise, appeals of bankruptcy judges’ rulings in core
proceedings will lie to the BAP.54 Appeals from BAP rulings lie to the
of claims, (3) objections to discharge, and (4) plan confirmation. Id. § 157(b)(2) (2000 & Supp. V
2005).
50. Id. § 157(b)(1) (2000). Unless, that is, the district court withdraws the reference to the
bankruptcy court. Id. § 157(d). In that case, the district court hears the matter in the first
instance, with appeals in the ordinary course lying to the court of appeals and then the Supreme
Court. See supra notes 47–48.
51. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The statute also authorizes the creation of intercircuit BAPs, id.
§ 158(b)(4), but none has yet been created. Much as the bankruptcy court is a unit of the district
court, the bankruptcy appellate panel may be seen as “a unit of the federal courts of appeals.”
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts, The Federal Judiciary—United States Courts of Appeals,
Bankruptcy Appellate Panels, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtsofappeals/bap.html (last visited Oct.
11, 2008); see also 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (requiring BAPs to be established and BAP judges to be
appointed by the circuit judicial council); B.A.P. 8TH CIR. R. 8016A(a)(1) (“The Clerk of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit shall serve as the Clerk of the United
States Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Eighth Circuit.”). Compare Coyne v. Westinghouse
Credit Corp. (In re Globe Illumination Co.), 149 B.R. 614, 620–21 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1993)
(describing BAP as unit of the circuit court), with Kathleen P. March & Rigoberto V. Obregon,
Are BAP Decisions Binding on Any Court?, 18 CAL. BANKR. J. 189, 197 (1990) (describing BAP as
unit of the district court).
52. The 1994 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code were designed to encourage circuit
courts to create BAPs by directing that each circuit “shall establish” a BAP unless the circuit
judicial council finds that existing judicial resources are insufficient to establish one or that its
establishment would result in undue delay or increased cost to parties in cases under the
Bankruptcy Code. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1). The six regional circuits that voted against establishing
BAPs “concluded that the appellate process was functioning well as already constituted and that
BAPs would create undue delay or increase the cost of appeals.” Henry J. Boroff, The
Precedential Effect of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Decisions, 103 COM. L.J. 212, 214 n.10 (1998)
(citing Elizabeth Abbott, Bankruptcy Review Panel Makes Debut, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 3, 1997, at
B1). For a historical discussion of BAPs, see Bryan T. Camp, Bound by the BAP: The Stare
Decisis Effects of BAP Decisions, 34 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1643, 1648–60 (1997); infra note 75.
53. 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(6). In the mid-1990s, when a Second Circuit BAP was in existence,
“only three districts participate[d]—and these together typically receive[d] less than a third of all
bankruptcy petitions filed in the Second Circuit.” Camp, supra note 52, at 1660. These facts,
presumably, played a large role in the ultimate decision to disband the Second Circuit BAP.
54. 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
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circuit courts of appeals.55 Parties may seek discretionary review by
the Supreme Court of rulings by the courts of appeals.56
If either the appellant or the appellee so elects—or if the circuit
has not created a BAP or, even if it has, if the district court in
question has not voted to authorize BAP appeals—then the district
court (in the person of a single district judge) initially hears appeals of
bankruptcy court rulings in core proceedings.57 The judgment of the
district court may then be appealed to the appropriate circuit court of
appeals,58 with discretionary Supreme Court review as the remaining
appellate step.59 In short, then, certain parties in some circuits have
an option between two possible appellate paths.60 We illustrate this in
Figure 1.61

55. Id. § 158(d)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
56. Id. § 1254(1) (2000).
57. Id. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
58. Id. § 158(d)(1) (Supp. V 2005).
59. Id. § 1254(1) (2000).
60. See generally Bernard Trujillo, Self-Organizing Legal Systems: Precedent and Variation
in Bankruptcy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 483, 490–500 (elucidating the differences between the
standard federal judicial hierarchy and the bankruptcy appellate system).
61. We should note that a third possible appellate path not yet discussed—that of direct
appeal from the bankruptcy court to the court of appeals—exists for a limited set of
circumstances. By virtue of amendment to the Judicial Code by the Bankruptcy Abuse
Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23, appeal may
proceed directly to the court of appeals pursuant to a certification procedure if one of the
following circumstances exists: (1) the appeal involves a question of law unresolved by the court
of appeals for the circuit or by the Supreme Court; (2) the appeal involves a matter of public
importance; (3) the appeal involves a question of law requiring resolution of conflicting decisions;
or (4) the appeal may materially advance the progress of the case or proceeding in which the
appeal is taken. 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2)(A) (Supp. V 2005).
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FIGURE 1
FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE STRUCTURE
FOR CORE PROCEEDINGS

Discretionary Final Review:
Supreme Court

Second-Tier
Intermediate Review:
Court of Appeals
First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 1)

First-Tier
Intermediate Review:
(Possibility 2)

District Court

BAP

Initial Determination:
Bankruptcy Court

A comparison of BAPs to district courts suggests that BAPs
have more of the features of quality appellate review than do the
district courts. First, bankruptcy appellate panels are collegial bodies
that decide cases in three-judge panels. Indeed, bankruptcy judges
who serve on BAPs themselves believe that reviewing cases in panels
of judges benefits decisionmaking.62 By contrast, bankruptcy appeals
to district courts are heard by a single district judge.
Second, the bankruptcy judges who comprise bankruptcy
appellate panels are (by virtue of their appointment as bankruptcy

62. Ralph R. Mabey, The Evolving Bankruptcy Bench: How Are the “Units” Faring?, 47 B.C.
L. REV. 105, 123 (2005).
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judges) presumably experts in bankruptcy law.63 Thus, they are well
suited to resolve legal issues that might arise in core bankruptcy
proceedings.64 District judges, by contrast, are more often
characterized as generalists in the law, without special training or
experience in bankruptcy law.65
The third factor—“other” lawfinding ability66—appears to favor
neither district judges nor bankruptcy appellate panels. Attorneys
filing appellate briefs may focus on the legal issues without the
distractions of trial advocacy, whether the briefs are filed with the
district court or appellate panel. Similarly, both district judges and
bankruptcy appellate panels hear legal issues once a factual record
has been established. Last, while district judges and bankruptcy
judges both preside over trials, neither the district judge hearing a
bankruptcy appeal, nor bankruptcy judges sitting on a bankruptcy
appellate panel, are presiding over a trial as part of the appellate
process.67
63. See, e.g., id. at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy practitioners in
their prior careers.”); see also id. at 123 (noting that, of a random survey of bankruptcy judges in
2005, “[a]bout 83% . . . were bankruptcy practitioners before taking the bankruptcy bench,” and
that, “[o]f the 17% . . . who were not bankruptcy practitioners, almost all came from a business
law background, as commercial litigators or corporate transactional lawyers,” and further noting
that the surveyed bankruptcy judges felt that their prior experience was very helpful on the
bench); cf. id. at 113–16 (discussing the trend among bankruptcy judges to hire more permanent,
as opposed to term, law clerks, and noting that those bankruptcy judges who preferred
permanent clerks often hired clerks with legal experience, and in particular practice experience
in bankruptcy law).
64. See Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“[T]he BAP is desirable because it allows
specialist bankruptcy judges to replace nonspecialist federal district court judges.”); see also
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Chris Guthrie & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Bankruptcy Judge’s Mind,
86 B.U. L. REV. 1227, 1230–31 (2006) (reporting empirical finding that bankruptcy judges as
specialized actors perform “at least as well” as generalist judges in terms of not exhibiting typical
biases often reflected in judgments).
65. One might argue that even district judges with no experience in bankruptcy before
ascending to the bench gain some experience by virtue of hearing a steady stream of bankruptcy
cases. A study by the Federal Judicial Center of the bankruptcy appellate structure, however,
reached the opposite conclusion, observing that “[t]he number of first-level reviewers greatly
exceeds the number of bankruptcy judges producing the judgments reviewed, and appellate
caseloads are spread thinly among district judges, giving few judges much opportunity to develop
bankruptcy expertise.” Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Alternative Structures for
Bankruptcy Appeals, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 625, 627 (2002).
66. We employ the modifier “other” because, as noted above, the Court suggested that the
use of multi-judge panels is “[p]erhaps most important” in assessing lawfinding ability. Supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
67. It is this factor that, presumably, vests district judges with lawfinding ability when they
sit by designation on court of appeals panels. See Nash, supra note 1, at 1031 (explaining that
the better term is lawfinding “ability” and not lawfinding “expertise”). One might argue that
lawfinding ability is enhanced to the extent that the judge (whether district or bankruptcy)
enjoys relief from her other responsibilities while hearing appeals. This seems not to be the case,
however, at least for bankruptcy judges:
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Fourth, bankruptcy appellate panels conform to traditional
notions of appellate review: their rulings are generally seen to be
binding on future bankruptcy appellate panels drawn from the same
circuit.68 Further, at least one BAP has held that its decisions are
binding on all bankruptcy courts within that circuit,69 even if the
bankruptcy courts themselves do not share this view.70 In contrast,
When asked how BAP service affects their service as a bankruptcy judge,
several of the [surveyed bankruptcy judges] indicated that it required
adjustments to their bankruptcy court trial and hearing schedule and that it
substantially added to their workload. Some of the Survey Participants
suggested that those bankruptcy judges who serve full-time on the BAP
should have the option of employing an additional law clerk. One Survey
Participant indicated that service on the BAP was “like having a second job.”
Mabey, supra note 62, at 122 (footnote omitted); see also Stephen A. Stripp, An Analysis of the
Role of the Bankruptcy Judge and the Use of Judicial Time, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1329, 1330
(1993) (“The fundamental truth which is the basis for this article is that the bankruptcy caseload
in many districts in this country is so overwhelming that the bankruptcy judges are sorely
pressed in the struggle to cope with it.”).
68. BAPs in three circuits—the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth—have reached this conclusion.
E.g., Concannon v. Imperial Cap. Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 95 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006)
(reaffirming that the BAP will not overrule its prior rulings unless an intervening circuit court or
Supreme Court decision, or subsequent legislation, undermines those rulings); Salomon N. Am.
v. Knupfer (In re Wind N’ Wave), 328 B.R. 176, 181 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005) (same); Blagg v. Miller
(In re Blagg), 223 B.R. 795, 804 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (“Our decision is dictated by the principle
that we are bound by prior panel decisions. A panel cannot overrule the judgment of another
panel of the court.”), appeal dismissed, 198 F.3d 257 (10th Cir. 1999); Smolen v. Hatley (In re
Hatley), 227 B.R. 757, 761 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 1998) (same), aff’d, 194 F.3d 1320 (10th Cir. 1999);
Luedtke v. Nationsbanc Mortgage Co. (In re Luedtke), 215 B.R. 390, 391 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 1997)
(relying on circuit court precedent that circuit court panel decisions bind subsequent circuit court
panels to announce rule that BAP decisions bind subsequent BAP panels); Ball v. Payco-Gen.
Am. Credits, Inc. (In re Ball), 185 B.R. 595, 597 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1995) (“We will not overrule our
prior rulings unless a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Supreme Court decision or
subsequent legislation has undermined those rulings.”).
69. Philadelphia Life Ins. Co. v. Proudfoot (In re Proudfoot), 144 B.R. 876, 879 (B.A.P. 9th
Cir. 1992) (“[B]AP decisions originating in any district in the Ninth Circuit are binding precedent
on all bankruptcy courts within the Ninth Circuit in the absence of contrary authority from the
district court for the district in which the bankruptcy court sits.”); In re Windmill Farms, Inc., 70
B.R. 618, 622 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987), rev’d on other grounds, 841 F.2d 1467 (9th Cir. 1988).
70. Compare, e.g., Ore. Higher Educ. Assistance Found. v. Selden (In re Selden), 121 B.R.
59, 62 (D. Ore. 1990) (stating that BAP decisions bind only those bankruptcy courts sitting in the
district out of which the appeal arose), with Daly v. Deptula (In re Carrozzella & Richardson),
255 B.R. 267, 273 (Bankr. D. Conn. 2000) (rejecting argument that substantial motivation of
Congress in creating BAPs was to generate a uniform body of bankruptcy law within the circuits,
concluding that there is no principled reason why decisions of a BAP should have more
precedential authority than those of district courts, and finding it odd and unseemly, if not
unconstitutional, for a BAP—comprised of three non-Article III judges—to be generating for
bankruptcy judges, and perhaps also for district judges, the law of the circuit until the circuit
court had spoken), In re Virden, 279 B.R. 401, 409 n.12 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) (quoting In re
Carrozzella, 255 B.R. at 272-73), and Life Ins. Co. of Va. v. Barakat (In re Barakat), 173 B.R.
672, 676–80 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1994) (concluding that BAPs bind bankruptcy courts on matters
arising in core proceedings even though district courts do not), aff’d on other grounds, 99 F.3d
1520 (9th Cir. 1996). For further discussion regarding the precedential effect of BAP decisions,
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one district judge is generally not bound to follow the ruling of another
district judge—even one in the same district—on matters of
bankruptcy or otherwise.71 And bankruptcy courts have held that they
are not bound by the holding of a single district judge on a multijudge
district court.72 Therefore, BAPs comport more with the standard
model of appellate hierarchy than do district courts hearing
bankruptcy appeals.73
see Salomon N. Am., 328 B.R. at 181 n.2 (noting the Ninth Circuit BAP’s prior holding that its
decisions bind bankruptcy courts within the circuit, but also recognizing that some bankruptcy
courts have rejected that holding); Zimmer v. PSB Lending Corp. (In re Zimmer), 313 F.3d 1220,
1225 n.3 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing “binding nature of Bankruptcy Appellate Panel decisions” as
“an open question,” and “join[ing] Judge O’Scannlain’s call for the [Ninth Circuit] Judicial
Council to consider an order clarifying whether the bankruptcy courts must follow the BAP”);
Bank of Maui v. Estate Analysis, Inc., 904 F.2d 470, 472 (9th Cir. 1989) (“BAP decisions cannot
bind the district courts themselves. As article III courts, the district courts must always be free
to decline to follow BAP decisions and to formulate their own rules within their jurisdiction.”); id.
at 472 (O’Scannlain, J., concurring) (writing “separately to propose that the Judicial Council of
this Circuit consider adoption of an order requiring that Bankruptcy Appellate Panel . . .
decisions shall bind all of the bankruptcy courts of the circuit, subject to the restrictions imposed
by article III so well discussed in the [court’s] opinion”); Paul M. Baisier & David G. Epstein,
Resolving Still Unresolved Issues of Bankruptcy Law: A Fence or an Ambulance, 69 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 525, 531 (1995) (“Even stronger arguments can be made against any stare decisis effect at all
for the opinion of a bankruptcy appellate panel.”); Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129–30 (“I
would argue that district courts should be bound by BAP decisions. The view that an Article I
court can never bind an Article III court is an overstatement.”); Trujillo, supra note 60, at 494
n.23 (arguing that BAPs function as district courts, and accordingly cannot issue binding
opinions).
71. See Baisier & Epstein, supra note 70, at 529 (noting that “[n]one of the district judges is
bound by a bankruptcy appeals decision of a district judge from one of the other 93 district
courts,” and that “district judges in multi-judge districts are not even bound by the bankruptcy
appeals decisions of other judges from that same district”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at
1095–96; id. at 1096 n.116 (“I am aware of only a handful of cases where district judges in the
same district adopt differing views of the same question of bankruptcy law and in those cases one
or both of the decisions is unpublished.”).
72. See, e.g., In re Romano, 350 B.R. 276, 281 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005) (“[A] single decision of
a district court in this multi-judge district is not binding upon this court.”); id. at 277–81
(summarizing authority for both sides); Paul Steven Singerman & Paul A. Avron, Of Precedents
and Bankruptcy Court Independence, 22 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 1, 56–57 (2003) (noting conflict,
gathering authorities, and finding that a majority of bankruptcy courts have held that they are
not bound by the decision of a single district court judge in a multi-judge district); Trujillo, supra
note 60, at 494 (arguing that a bankruptcy decision by one bankruptcy judge cannot bind other
bankruptcy judges in the same district, and that a bankruptcy decision by one district judge
cannot bind other district judges or bankruptcy judges in the same district). But see
Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 129 (“While a district court exercising original jurisdiction cannot
bind other district courts, its decisions should be binding on bankruptcy courts when the district
court is serving as an appeals court.”).
73. Our point here is simply that BAPs seem to fit more cleanly into the standard
hierarchical appellate model than do district courts sitting on appeal, not that that is necessarily
mandated under the current statutory scheme or normatively desirable. The latter two points
are debatable.
With respect to the current statutory scheme, there are statements in the legislative history
indicating that Congress created the BAPs to help foster greater uniformity in bankruptcy law.
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See, e.g., 140 CONG. REC. S14,463 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1994) (statement of Sen. Heflin) (“It should be
recognized that the creation of a bankruptcy appellate panel service can help to establish a
dependable body of bankruptcy case law.”). But see Daly, 255 B.R. at 273:
Any suggestion that Congress’ authorization of the creation of BAP Services
was motivated substantially by its desire to create a uniform body of
bankruptcy law within the circuits is not supported by the BAP Service’s
history, which instead suggests that BAPs were conceived primarily as a tool
for relieving district court judges of an ofttimes undesirable and burdensome
aspect of their workload.
At the same time, one can point to the certification procedure in section 158(d)(2) of the Judicial
Code—under which courts of appeals may decide interlocutory appeals when, among other
circumstances, the question raised is one “as to which there is no controlling decision of the court
of appeals for the circuit or of the Supreme Court of the United States,” 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(d)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. V 2005)—as evidence that Congress chose other, explicit means of
increasing bankruptcy law uniformity. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-31, at 148 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 88, 206.
Commentators are divided over whether BAP decisions bind bankruptcy courts. Compare,
e.g., Bussel, supra note 13, at 1098 (arguing that bankruptcy courts should consider both BAP
and district court decisions as binding precedent), Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 128 (“From [a]
functional perspective, I think that BAP decisions clearly should be binding on bankruptcy
courts.”), and Camp, supra note 52, at 1676–84 (arguing that BAPs should bind both bankruptcy
and district courts within a circuit), with Trujillo, supra note 60, at 492 (“[O]nly opinions of the
U.S. courts of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court bind bankruptcy courts by reason of formal
hierarchy.”), and Caminker, supra note 13, at 870–72 (arguing that theoretical considerations
argue in favor of bankruptcy courts being bound by district court decisions). Moreover, strict
application of vertical stare decisis is difficult, insofar as it is not certain until after the
bankruptcy court has issued judgment into which appellate path the case will proceed. Cf. Camp,
supra note 52, at 1682:
Since bankruptcy judges do not know at the time they make a decision
whether it will be a BAP or a district court that will hear any appeal, and
since no district court has so far considered itself bound by a BAP, it is no
surprise that many bankruptcy judges feel free to disregard BAP decisions.
Compare this to the United States Tax Court, which considers itself bound by its own precedent,
except insofar as it has also held that it is bound “to follow a Court of Appeals decision which is
squarely in point where appeal from [the] decision lies to that Court of Appeals.” Golsen v.
Comm’r, 54 T.C. 742, 756–57 (1970), aff’d, 445 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1971). Because the court of
appeals to which a taxpayer will appeal is determined by his state of residence, 26 U.S.C.
§ 7482(b)(1) (2000), it is always clear at the time of decision which circuit’s precedent is binding.
As to the normative question, there are those who argue that an increase in application of
stare decisis would be normatively desirable. See, e.g., Boroff, supra note 52, at 215, 221 (arguing
that the current dual track appellate system makes it difficult to generate binding precedent,
and that the system be changed to allow for development of binding precedent); Bussel, supra
note 13, at 1095 n.114 (“[L]ogically . . . district courts . . . as well as bankruptcy courts might be
bound by prior BAP decisions.”). There also are strong arguments, however, that a structure
other than the standard appellate hierarchy might be desirable. First, one of the bases on which
the pyramidal appellate hierarchy functions is the notion that issues “percolate” up from the
lower courts to the higher courts. It is the desire for percolation that, commentators argue,
restricts (and properly so) application of horizontal stare decisis to the same court and not to
sibling courts of equal hierarchical stature. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, The
Uneasy Case Against Intracircuit Nonacquiescence: A Reply, 99 YALE L.J. 831, 834 (1990) (“The
rejection of intercircuit stare decisis is premised upon—and given the obvious costs in deferring
uniformity, is explainable only in terms of—the benefits of dialogue among the circuits.”); see
also Maxwell Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL.
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L. REV. 1309, 1351–52 (1995) (arguing, based upon social choice theory, that the Supreme Court
“would desire intra- but not inter-circuit stare decisis,” since such a regime “avoids the
irrationality that would result from cyclical preferences within particular circuits, while, at the
same time, reducing the likelihood that legal doctrine that results from path manipulation in a
given circuit will be replicated across the circuits.”). But cf. O’Hara, supra note 17, at 772
(arguing that the absence of stare decisis across circuits is justified on the ground that “an
agreement to follow another circuit’s precedents will not save the judges in a particular circuit
much time”). In the case of appeals of core bankruptcy matters, there are, anomalously, two
levels of intermediate appeals. Perhaps, then, in order for issues properly to percolate up to the
courts of appeals, there ought to be no horizontal stare decisis at the first intermediate level—
that is, at the level of the BAPs and district courts.
Second, given that the BAPs and district courts lie at the same hierarchical level, it might
not make sense for horizontal stare decisis rules to apply to BAPs but not district courts.
Perhaps, once again, horizontal stare decisis should not apply at all. One might argue, to the
contrary, that horizontal stare decisis should apply to both courts. See Chemerinsky, supra note
4, at 129.
Third, perhaps bankruptcy law and society would be better served by a system other than
the traditional appellate hierarchy, at the lower levels of appeals of core bankruptcy matters.
Civil law systems rely far less on precedent than does the common law system dominant in the
United States. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Civil law judiciaries decide cases based
largely upon the proper interpretation of the governing “code.” Insofar as bankruptcy turns upon
the content of a code—the “Bankruptcy Code”—bankruptcy seems to provide an ideal setting for
application of such judicial review. Cf. Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the
Quest for First Principles in the Reform of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law
and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 173, 216 (2000) (arguing for “a softer, more nimble,
rule of precedent [that] would improve the quality of outcomes in particular bankruptcy cases”).
Interestingly, while Ponoroff facially argues in favor of increased reliance on a civil law
jurisprudential approach in the bankruptcy context, his arguments do not seem to accord so well
with the principles underlying the structure of judicial review in civil law systems. Dean
Ponoroff laments:
The opportunity for two levels of appeal as a matter of right has contributed
to the crush of reported decisions, a phenomenon that, in my view, has
hampered pragmatic and considered decisionmaking in the bankruptcy
courts. That problem is compounded by the disturbing rise in adherence to
textual or plain meaning methods of interpretation in bankruptcy cases,
particularly in the decisions of the circuit courts of appeal[s].
Id. at 181 (footnotes omitted). Ponoroff thus seems more concerned with allowing different
interpretations of the Bankruptcy Code to percolate up through the judiciary. He also seems to
embrace more of a realist conception of bankruptcy law than a civil law conception, explaining
that “[a] more forward-looking, and less technical and ‘busy,’ code would abate the pressure to
decide and review cases on the kind of formal, textualist grounds that typically prove the most
difficult to distinguish in subsequent cases.” Id. at 216. Indeed, Ponoroff acknowledges that he
endorses “a different style of judging, one that eschews a strict adherence to precedent, but not
by any means civilian, to the extent that style is perceived as the unimaginative and rote
application of positive legal rules to particular fact situations performed by a cadre of mid-level
bureaucrats.” Id. at 223. “Rather,” he endorses “a style that actually places greater responsibility
on the decisionmaker to reason analogically from code principles, as well as from subsidiary
sources such as custom, usages, settled jurisprudential doctrine, and equity.” Id. at 223–24.
To the possible objection that the fact that the higher levels of bankruptcy judicial review—
courts of appeals and the Supreme Court—rely upon the standard appellate hierarchy, one can
point to the coexistence of Louisiana’s civil law system within the United States judicial system
as an example of how such a system can function. See, e.g., Shelp v. Nat’l Sur. Corp., 333 F.2d
431, 439 (5th Cir. 1964) (in determining Louisiana law under Erie, federal courts should apply
precedential rules that Louisiana’s highest court would apply); Alvin Rubin, Hazards of a

NASHPARDO_PAGE

2008]

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE

1765

It is only the final criterion—the question of judicial
independence—on which district courts have some advantage over
bankruptcy appellate panels. Judicial independence has been
considered to be a function of life tenure and the guarantee of
nonreduction in salary. Both attributes are enshrined in the Article III
status conferred on district judges, whereas bankruptcy judges who sit
on bankruptcy appellate panels do not get the benefit of either
attribute because of their non-Article III status.74
On this basis, one might readily conclude that district judges
enjoy judicial independence while bankruptcy judges do not. But this
would be a facile conclusion that improperly casts the assessment of
judicial independence as an all-or-nothing proposition—that is,
judicial independence is attainable only through life tenure and the
guarantee of nonreducible remuneration. Careful consideration of the
matter, however, suggests that the difference may be narrower than
that generally perceived by courts and commentators.
A more felicitous account reveals that the term of appointment
for bankruptcy judges, the standard for their removal from office, the
treatment of their compensation, and the manner of their
appointment afford bankruptcy judges a moderate amount of judicial
independence. First, although bankruptcy judges are not granted life

Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 LA. L. REV. 1369
(1988). But see John Burritt McArthur, Good Intentions Gone Bad: The Special No-Deference Erie
Rule for Louisiana State Court Decisions, 66 LA. L. REV. 313 (2006). Indeed, the notion that
bankruptcy courts do not consider themselves bound by rulings of single district judges in multijudge districts—and therefore presumably do at some point consider themselves bound once a
number of district judges in the same district reach the same conclusion—resembles the
“jurisprudence constante” under which precedent develops in Louisiana and other civil law
systems. See, e.g., Kathryn Venturatos Lorio, The Louisiana Civil Law Tradition: Archaic or
Prophetic in the Twenty-First Century, 63 LA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2002) (describing jurisprudence
constante as a doctrine under which “a case may be used to discern a pattern [of decisions] that
may aid in interpretation”); Stearns, supra, at 1357 n.143 (discussing jurisprudence constante);
cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 257 (1985) (proposing, “as a
special rule of stare decisis, the practice that when the first three circuits to decide an issue have
decided it the same way, the remaining circuits defer to that decision”). Any potential difficulties
in integrating a civil law precedential model into the larger common law-based federal court
system would be mitigated by the fact that the vast majority of bankruptcy cases are not
appealed beyond the first level of intermediate appellate review. See Bussel, supra note 13, at
1091; cf. Chemerinsky, supra note 4, at 122 (noting that “[b]ankruptcy law matters seem to fit in
between . . . two poles” in that “bankruptcy statutes are filled with ambiguities that require court
interpretation,” while there also “probably exist particular types of disputes where the law-giving
function of the court is less important and alternative dispute resolution would be potentially
more efficient”). But see Bussel, supra note 13, at 1097 (“I would have difficulty understanding
why Congress would intend BAPs and district courts to serve merely as rest-stops on the road to
real appellate review.”).
74. See supra notes 36–38 and accompanying text.
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tenure, their terms last fourteen years.75 Moreover, their
appointments may be renewed,76 and indeed in most cases are
renewed.77 While judicial independence may be fostered by life tenure,
the renewable, fourteen-year term of bankruptcy judges effectively
allows them to serve as long as many of their Article III
counterparts.78 Even if the absence of life tenure gives Congress
leeway to reduce the term of bankruptcy judges79—an option that it
has never exercised since it created the bankruptcy courts—the
fourteen-year, renewable term still grants a fair amount of judicial
independence to bankruptcy judges.80
Second, the Judicial Code prescribes that a bankruptcy judge
may be removed “only for incompetence, misconduct, neglect of duty,
or physical or mental disability,”81 whereas the Constitution mandates
that an Article III judge will hold his or her office only “during good
Behaviour.”82 The broad language of the good-behavior standard for

75. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
76. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 303, 110 Stat.
3847, 3852 (providing that, “[w]hen filling vacancies, the court of appeals may consider
reappointing incumbent bankruptcy judges under procedures prescribed by regulations issued by
the Judicial Conference of the United States”).
77. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (noting that, of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the
bench in the decade prior to 2005, only 10 did so as a result of not being reappointed); see also
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations § 1(e)
(2001), available at http://207.41.19.15/Web/OCELibra.nsf (follow “Bankruptcy” hyperlink; then
follow “Bankruptcy Judge Reappointment Regulations” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 25, 2008)
(providing that “[t]he court of appeals shall decide whether or not to reappoint the incumbent
[bankruptcy] judge before considering other potentially qualified candidates” (emphasis added)).
To the contrary, one might argue that the fact that bankruptcy judges must seek, and generally
receive, reappointment, demonstrates the absence of judicial independence.
78. See In re Grabill Corp., 976 F.2d 1126, 1129 (7th Cir. 1992) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)
(“Rhetoric about life tenure notwithstanding, there is no substantial difference between the 14year term to which bankruptcy judges are appointed and service ‘during good Behavior’ for
Article III judges.”). Article III judges (other than Supreme Court Justices) whose service on the
federal bench terminated between 1983 and 2003 served, on average, twenty-four years. Judith
Resnik, Judicial Selection and Democratic Theory: Demand, Supply, and Life Tenure, 26
CARDOZO L. REV. 579, 618 chart 4 (2005).
79. While Congress may reduce the duration of the fixed-term appointment for bankruptcy
judges at any point via statute, the constitutionally guaranteed life tenure granted to Article III
judges could only be stripped away via constitutional amendment (an exponentially more
difficult proposition).
80. See COMM’N ON THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE
BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt. 1, at 95 (1973) (proposing
various reforms “to enhance the real and apparent judicial independence of bankruptcy judges,”
including “[e]xtension of the term of the bankruptcy judges from the present six years to the
proposed fifteen years”); cf. Nash, supra note 20, at 2196 (observing that “one can question the
degree to which life tenure in fact secures for judges a larger measure of judicial independence”).
81. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2000).
82. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
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removal arguably encompasses the grounds set forth by the Judicial
Code for removal of bankruptcy judges. Moreover, while Article III
judges may be removed only by impeachment,83 and bankruptcy
judges may be removed by a majority of all of the judges of the judicial
council of the bankruptcy judge’s circuit,84 the practical reality is that
very few bankruptcy judges have been removed from office.85 If the
specter of removal does not appear to be greater for bankruptcy judges
than Article III judges, it follows that bankruptcy judges need not
limit their behavior in ways that would prevent them from acting as
independently as Article III judges.
Third, although the Supreme Court has identified the “fixed
and irreducible” compensation provided to Article III judges by the
Compensation Clause as a hallmark of an independent judiciary,86 the
lack of a similar guarantee in the salaries of bankruptcy judges should
not be overemphasized in assessing their judicial independence. Since
Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 and created the
current scheme for federal bankruptcy judgeships, the salary of
bankruptcy judges has only increased.87 Moreover, since 1987,
bankruptcy judges have received a salary at an annual rate that
equals 92% of the salary of district court judges (as determined by
section 135 of the Judicial Code).88 Thus, for the past two decades,
bankruptcy judges have had fixed compensation that nearly equals
that of district court judges.
Finally, if one takes into account the substantive differences in
the appointment processes of bankruptcy judges and district judges
and the consequences that flow therefrom, it becomes clear that
bankruptcy judges may be better situated than district judges to resist
the political influence that would threaten to compromise an
independent judiciary. While the judicial appointment process for
83. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion) (“The ‘good Behaviour’ Clause guarantees that Art. III judges shall enjoy life
tenure, subject only to removal by impeachment.”). But see Saikrishna Prakash & Steven D.
Smith, How to Remove a Federal Judge, 116 YALE. L.J. 72 (2006) (arguing that federal judges
may be removed from office by means other than impeachment).
84. 28 U.S.C. § 152(e).
85. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (listing reasons for departure from the bench for the
115 bankruptcy judges who did so in the decade prior to 2005, but not mentioning removal as one
of those reasons). On the other hand, one might argue that the low rate of removal of bankruptcy
judges reflects the absence of judicial independence: bankruptcy judges have behaved in a way so
as to avoid removal.
86. N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. 50 at 59 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
87. See Mabey, supra note 62, app. A.
88. 28 U.S.C. § 153(a). Congress amended the Judicial Code in 1987 to provide for the
current salary structure for bankruptcy judges. Pub. L. No. 100-202, § 408(a), 101 Stat. 1329,
1329-26 (1987).
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Article III judges has become increasingly politicized, evidenced most
recently by the tendency for close examination of the ideology of
nominees,89 the appointment process for bankruptcy judges has
seemingly remained nonpolitical. The Judicial Code charges the
appointment task to the court of appeals for the circuit in which there
exists a vacancy for a bankruptcy judgeship.90 Thus, the appointment
process involves judges selecting judges—a presumably nonpolitical
process.91 This nonpolitical process has produced a bankruptcy bench

89. See Nash, supra note 20, at 2182–92.
90. 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(1) (Supp. V 2005); id. § 152(a)(3) (2000).
91. The possibility exists, however, that the judicial appointment of judges may substitute
judicial patronage for political patronage and thus compromise judicial independence. See Judith
Resnik, “Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice”: Inventing the Federal District Courts of the
Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 673 (2002). But
see Posner, supra note 23, at 81–82 (“Appointments by the judicial branch are not as
controversial, because judges belong to different parties.”). Furthermore, one may argue that,
insofar as the circuit judges are a product of a politicized appointment process, they themselves
may be politicized and thus infuse politics into the appointment process for bankruptcy judges.
The merit-selection process for appointing bankruptcy judges, however, seems to have provided
little opportunity for such politicization to take root. A quick look at the manner in which the
Ninth Circuit conducts this process (one that seems representative of the process conducted in
other circuits) suggests why this has been the case.
Interested candidates must submit applications for the position. See Judicial Council of the
Ninth Circuit, Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges § 2.02 (2001),
available at http://207.41.19.15/Web/OCELibra.nsf (follow “Bankruptcy” hyperlink; then follow
“Regulations Governing the Appointment of U.S. Bankruptcy Judges” hyperlink) (last visited
Oct. 25, 2008). The Circuit advertises nationally and encourages the federal judicial districts
within the circuit to advertise intensely and locally. Id. § 2.01. A local merit screening committee,
which generally consists of (1) the chief judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is to
be appointed, (2) the president of the state bar association, (3) the president of one or more local
bar associations within the district, (4) the dean of a law school located within the district, (5) the
administrative circuit judge of the circuit geographical unit in which the bankruptcy judge is to
be appointed, and (6) the chief bankruptcy judge of the district in which the bankruptcy judge is
to be appointed. Id. § 3.02(a). The committee recommends five applicants to the Court-Council
Committee on Bankruptcy Appointments, whose membership includes three circuit judges who
serve as voting members. See id. §§ 3.03(c)(1), 3.04(b). The Court-Council Committee circulates a
report to the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council recommending a candidate for appointment, and
that report will be deemed to be the Judicial Council’s recommendation to the Court of Appeals
(unless the Council determines that the Court-Council Committee should reconsider its
recommendation). Id. §§ 3.04(c)(5), 3.05(a). The recommended candidate is appointed upon a
majority vote of the members of the Court of Appeals. 28 U.S.C § 152(a)(3) (2000).
For the argument that the nonpolitical nature of the bankruptcy bench may be attributable
to the opacity of the process for selecting bankruptcy judges, see Rafael I. Pardo, The Utility of
Opacity in Judicial Selection, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. (forthcoming 2008), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1205002.

NASHPARDO_PAGE

2008]

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE

1769

populated mostly by specialists with bankruptcy expertise92 who
themselves could be characterized as nonpolitical.93
When one considers the type of jurist produced by the judicial
selection process for bankruptcy judges in conjunction with their term
of appointment, the standard for their removal, and the treatment
afforded to their compensation, it would appear that bankruptcy
judges have achieved a considerable degree of judicial independence.94
Accordingly, while the district court seems to enjoy some advantage
over BAPs with respect to this final attribute identified as improving
the quality of appellate review, the advantage is not likely to be
substantial. We summarize the differences in the attributes of the
BAPs and district courts below in Table 1.
TABLE 1
STRUCTURE OF DISTRICT COURTS AND BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANELS
First-Tier
Appellate
Court

Number
of
Judges

Bankruptcy
Expertise

Other
Lawfinding
Ability

Traditional
Appellate
Hierarchy

Judicial
Independence

District
Court

Single
judge

Unlikely

Some

Weak

Strong

Bankruptcy
Appellate
Panel

Panel of
three
judges

Yes

Some

Strong

Moderate

B. Hypotheses
Insofar as BAPs exhibit more of the features associated with
quality appellate review than do federal district courts, the discussion
in Part I suggests that BAPs will provide a higher quality of
92. See Mabey, supra note 62, at 107 (“Most of the bankruptcy judges were bankruptcy
practitioners in their prior careers.”).
93. Cf. Resnik, supra note 91, at 670 (“Turn first to the advantages of judicial appointment
of judges. As a few details of current practices illustrate, the judiciary has selected a high-quality
and relatively nonpolitical corps of judges . . . .”).
94. This state of affairs can be traced to congressional efforts in the 1970s to elevate the
status of bankruptcy judges. Congress established in 1970 the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws of the United States to evaluate the then-existing bankruptcy system and to suggest
recommendations for its reform. Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970). In its report, the
Commission envisioned that improvements in the appointment, tenure, and compensation of
bankruptcy judges would enhance their “real and apparent judicial independence.” COMM’N ON
THE BANKR. LAWS OF THE U.S., REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCY LAWS OF THE
UNITED STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 93-137, pt.1, at 95 (1973).
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bankruptcy appellate review than their district court counterparts—
assuming, of course, that the question of judicial independence does
not outweigh other factors. Many challenges stand in the way of
investigating this general claim, chief among them the difficulty in
empirically testing the “correctness” of the dispositions rendered by
the appellate court. Knowledge of this would be crucial for purposes of
ascertaining whether the appellate court had appropriately performed
its appellate function—that is, identifying error in those instances
when it occurred. Making such a determination would necessarily
involve content analysis of appellate opinions according to a particular
metric of correctness. It is difficult to develop such a metric without
infusing a degree of inherent subjectivity into its design. What we may
deem to be a “correct” decision may be “incorrect” according to others.
Accordingly, at the initial stage of empirical inquiry, we are not
persuaded that detailed content analysis of appellate opinions is
warranted.95
Absent detailed content analysis of appellate opinions, how
might we empirically proceed with our inquiry into the quality of
appellate review? Although we cannot empirically test the
“correctness” of decisions, we can empirically test the perception held
by other actors within the bankruptcy judicial system of the
correctness of those decisions. For those bankruptcy appeals that
proceed to the second tier of review, we can consider whether the court
of appeals deemed proper the disposition rendered by the first-tier
appellate court.
There are several ways in which the rate at which a higher
court upholds a lower court’s disposition may shed light upon judicial
perceptions of correctness of lower court decisions.96 First, there is a
tautological sense in which what an appellate court says is, by
95. Professor Frank Cross has expressed a similar view in his empirical study of decisions
rendered by U.S. Courts of Appeals:
[T]here are typically nonfrivolous legal arguments for each side in circuit
court cases, so it is impossible to code certain cases as being legally correct (or
incorrect) without the researcher second-guessing and effectively overriding
the judge. Such an approach offers an unreliable tool for evaluating judicial
decisions because it probably reflects more about the researcher than about
the judges being evaluated. Research requires a more objective tool for
evaluating the law.
FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 46–47 (2007).
96. But see Wagner & Petherbridge, supra note 5, at 1127–28 (noting the limits of “resultoriented statistical studies”); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A
New Window into the Behavior of Judges? 5 (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Paper
No. 06-29, 2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=913663 (using empirical data to argue
that judges of one political party are more likely to cite opinions authored by judges of the same
party, especially in particular “high stakes” settings).
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definition, correct (unless, that is, the appellate court decision is itself
reversed). Thus, if an appellate court affirms the disposition of a lower
court, then the lower court’s disposition was correct. Second, one can
presume that the appellate court wishes to resolve the legal issues
“correctly” for the parties and for future courts.97 The law generally
calls upon appellate courts to examine legal issues de novo without
deference to the reasoning or conclusion of the court below.98 Still, if
the appellate court ultimately reaches the same conclusion as the
court below, then it is accurate to say that the appellate court
perceived the lower court’s conclusion to be correct.99
However, courts of appeals may not always affirm a decision
because they believe the earlier decision was “correct.” Judges need
not be so selfless. Indeed, there is a school of thought that views
judges, like all people, as self-interested actors.100 Judges may be
interested in keeping their jobs—for bankruptcy judges, this
translates to reappointment. Insofar as district judges enjoy Article III
status, they have life tenure and are guaranteed not to suffer any
salary reductions. Still, even Article III judges may have dreams of

97. See supra note 17.
98. See, e.g., Concannon v. Imperial Capital Bank (In re Concannon), 338 B.R. 90, 93
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e review the bankruptcy court’s conclusions of law and interpretation
of the Bankruptcy Code de novo.”); Official Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Valley-Vulcan Mold
Co. v. Ampco-Pittsburgh Corp. (In re Valley-Vulcan Mold Co.), 237 B.R. 322, 326 (B.A.P. 6th Cir.
1999) (stating that conclusions of law by bankruptcy court are reviewed by BAP de novo); 9
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2588, at 470
(2006).
99. It is possible that, notwithstanding the legal standard to the contrary, appellate courts
do not always reexamine legal issues de novo in practice. Perhaps, for example, courts of appeals
are inclined to rely upon the expertise of BAPs (sub rosa, of course, since the law dictates
otherwise) and thus are inclined to affirm BAP opinions. Or, perhaps equally, the appellate
courts might more often than not affirm district court opinions on the ground that district judges
enjoy Article III status and thus are independent. In either case, it would be accurate to view an
appellate court affirmance as embracing the lower court opinion as correct.
100. See O’Hara, supra note 17, at 737–38 (suggesting that judges make decisions “to impose
their normative views, beliefs, and mores on [society]”); Richard A. Posner, What Do Judges and
Justices Maximize? (The Same Thing Everyone Else Does), 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 1, 39 (1993)
(“Judges are rational, and they pursue instrumental and consumption goals of the same general
kind and in the same general way that private persons do.”).
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higher office.101 Article III judges—and, for that matter, BAP judges—
may also wish to avoid the “ignominy” of reversal by a higher court.102
Even if BAP judges and district judges have an aversion to
reversal, that ought not to change appellate judges’ behavior in terms
of upholding the conclusion of lower court decisions, assuming at least
that the reappointment or elevation process does not demand political
decisionmaking.103 Put another way, a judge—whether a bankruptcy
judge serving on a BAP or a district judge—who wants to be
reappointed or elevated has essentially the same incentive to decide
cases correctly as do judges who simply want to decide the disputes
before them correctly. As such, a court reviewing a first-level
intermediate bankruptcy appellate decision—whether a panel of a
court of appeals or the Supreme Court—should adopt the conclusion of
the lower court if it deems that conclusion to be “correct.” Similarly,
appellate court judges should seek to affirm correct decisions—and
reverse incorrect ones—even if their motives are not strictly to reach
correct outcomes.
Based upon the foregoing, we offer the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: Courts of appeals more likely will uphold the
dispositions rendered by BAPs than those rendered by district courts.
Citation rates provide yet another basis on which to test
empirically the perceived correctness of an appellate opinion.104 To the

101. See Nash, supra note 20, at 2196. Indeed, Professor Resnik has identified such
careerism by bankruptcy judges. See Resnik, supra note 91, at 673 (observing that “[a]n
increasingly well-trodden path is for a person to shift from magistrate or bankruptcy judge to
district court judge”). A recent study of the bankruptcy bench, however, indicated that only eight
of the 115 bankruptcy judges who left the bench from 1995 to 2005 did so as a result of
appointment to an Article III judgeship. Mabey, supra note 62, at 107.
102. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 13, at 827 & n.40 and the authorities cited therein; see
also Nash, supra note 20, at 2197–98 (discussing the desire of Article III judges to avoid
impeachment, public chastisement, and overruling by the legislature).
103. Note, however, that other motivations may explain bankruptcy judges’ behavior. See,
e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE: HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS (2005) (arguing that bankruptcy judges in different districts compete
for large corporate bankruptcy cases); Marcus Cole, ‘Delaware Is Not a State’: Are We Witnessing
Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1890–93 (2002) (arguing that,
in order to conform to dominant state culture favorable to corporations, Delaware bankruptcy
judges compete for corporate bankruptcy filings).
104. See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249 (1976) (arguing that citation practices are not
essentially a matter of taste but rather are systematic and susceptible to empirical study); John
Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority: What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950,
6 STAN. L. REV. 613 (1954); John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical
Study of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960, and 1970, 50 S.
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extent that citation of one court by another reflects the citing court’s
view that the other court was “correct” in some way, the notion of
correctness is, in different ways, both narrower and broader than
correctness in the context of affirmation on direct appeal. It is
narrower in that the citing court well may be citing a case not based
upon a broad holding, but rather based upon some narrow holding or
even dicta. It is broader in that, unlike a court that affirms a lower
court’s disposition even though it disagrees with its reasoning, a court
that cites to another court’s decision positively at some level agrees
with some aspect of the court’s reasoning.105 Of course, there may be
situations where a court cites another court’s opinion simply because
it perceives the other court’s opinion to be binding precedent.106 For
this reason, we consider the results of extracircuit citations and
citations by courts of appeals to BAPs and district courts—settings
where there is no issue of binding precedent and citation is purely a
matter of choice—to be especially informative.107
Within this context, one can point to two broad notions as to
why courts cite other courts’ opinions; both accord with our broad
understanding of “correctness.” First, a court may cite to another
court’s decision because it is truly influenced by the other court’s
reasoning.108 If this is true, then the citing court in some sense finds
the other court’s reasoning to be “correct.” Alternatively (or perhaps in
addition), a court may cite to another court’s decision not so much to
explain the basis for its decision as to justify that decision, thus
CAL. L. REV. 381 (1977) [hereinafter Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations]; cf. William M.
Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of
Federal Courts of Appeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271–76 (1998) (noting that “[c]itations
are at best a crude and rough proxy for measuring influence,” and identifying potential
drawbacks and limitations to empirical analyses of judicial citations).
105. See Landes & Posner, supra note 104, at 251 & n.3 (excluding from citation study
“citations indicating rejection of the cited case as a precedent”). Our study also includes only
positive citations. But see Landes et al., supra note 104, at 273 (deciding “not [to] distinguish . . .
between favorable, critical, or distinguishing citations” insofar as “[c]ritical citations, in
particular to opinions outside the citing circuit, are also a gauge of influence since it is easier to
ignore an unimportant decision than to spell out reasons for not following it”).
106. See Landes & Posner, supra note 104, at 251 (excluding from citation study
nonprecedential citations).
107. David J. Walsh, On the Meaning and Pattern of Legal Citations: Evidence from State
Wrongful Discharge Precedent Cases, 31 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 337, 340–41 (1997) (stating that cases
cited for their influential nature will depend more on the quality of the decisions than the
stature of the cited court).
108. See id. at 339 (suggesting that citations may “indicate intercourt communication and
influence on judicial decisionmaking”); cf. McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 651 (“The
availability of published opinions is generally thought to be an important aspect of the appellate
process because written opinions provide guidance to judges and litigants by explaining the
reasons for the appellate decision.”).
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making the “primary function” of citations one of “legitimation.”109
Even if a court simply cites to another court to legitimate its own
conclusions, we would say that the citing court perceives of the other
court’s reasoning as “correct” in some sense. Indeed, the citing court is
using the citation to bolster the perception that its own reasoning and
conclusions are “correct.”
In light of the foregoing, and as detailed below, we proceed to
test the perceived correctness of an appellate opinion by considering
(1) the propensity of other federal courts within the bankruptcy
judicial structure to cite the opinions issued by first-tier appellate
courts, (2) the depth of treatment given to such opinions by federal
citing courts (including direct quotation),110 and (3) the immediacy
with which such opinions garner a citing reference. Accordingly, we
offer the following additional hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2A: Federal courts more likely will positively cite to BAP
opinions than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 2B: Federal courts will positively cite to BAP opinions more
frequently than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 3: Courts of appeals will cite more frequently to BAP
opinions than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 4: Bankruptcy courts will cite more frequently to BAP
opinions than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 5: BAPs will cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to
district court opinions.
Hypothesis 6: District courts will cite more frequently to district court
opinions than to BAP opinions.
Hypothesis 7: Federal courts outside of the circuit of the first-tier
appellate court that issued the opinion (extracircuit federal courts) will
cite more frequently to BAP opinions than to district court opinions.
Hypothesis 8: Positive federal citing references will afford a greater
depth of treatment to BAP opinions than to district court opinions.

109. Walsh, supra note 107, at 339.
110. Cf. id. at 342 (distinguishing between “strong” and “weak” citations).

NASHPARDO_PAGE

2008]

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

INVESTIGATING APPELLATE STRUCTURE

1775

Hypothesis 9A: Positive federal citing references are more likely to
quote directly BAP opinions than district court opinions.
Hypothesis 9B: Positive federal citing references will directly quote
BAP opinions more frequently than district court opinions.
Hypothesis 10: The time within which a federal citing reference will be
made to opinions issued on appeal by BAPs will be faster than to those
issued by district courts.
Notably, in Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7, we hypothesize that
BAP opinions will be cited more often than district court opinions. We
suggest this on the ground that several factors weigh in favor of the
conclusion that BAPs will resolve issues of bankruptcy law “correctly,”
while only one factor—judicial independence—weighs in favor of
district courts.
It seems to us highly probable, a priori, that bankruptcy judges
and BAP judges are unlikely to be concerned with the fact that the
bankruptcy judges who serve on BAPs do not enjoy Article III
status.111 Accordingly, we have developed Hypotheses 4 and 5.
Hypothesis 3 is to similar effect. It seems to us that courts of appeals
would be more focused on the structural factors favoring BAPs than
the lack of Article III status—particularly with respect to subjectmatter expertise.112 Note first that, to the extent that the absence of
Article III status may suggest a lack of independence vis-à-vis the
issues in the case or the parties, that problem is greatly ameliorated
by the fact that the parties must have consented in order to have the
BAP issue a decision in the first place. Second, court of appeals judges
presumably do not need the buffer of Article III status to remind them
that they sit several notches above bankruptcy judges and BAPs on
the judicial food chain.113
The same cannot be said for district judges. That district judges
lobbied against giving bankruptcy judges Article III status
demonstrates how important it is to district judges that bankruptcy

111. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 628 (“Bankruptcy appellate panel (BAP)
judges provide specialized bankruptcy expertise that their bankruptcy colleagues . . . value
highly as a source of authority.”).
112. See id. at 678 (“Circuit judges, on average, have less specialized knowledge than
bankruptcy judges, particularly those selected to serve on BAPs.”).
113. It is also conceivable that courts of appeals in circuits that have BAPs are somewhat
favorably inclined to cite to those BAPs, to the extent that they consider the BAPs to be adjuncts
of the courts of appeals. See supra note 51.
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judges not enjoy this status.114 Further, district judges lie on the same
level as BAPs on the bankruptcy appellate hierarchy.115 In short, it
seems that district judges will think of BAPs as coequals in terms of
hierarchy at best, and as subordinates at worst. Accordingly, we think
it comparatively less likely that district judges, as opposed to other
federal judges, would look to opinions authored by BAPs as opposed to
district judges. It is on these bases that we preliminarily offer
Hypothesis 6.
Given our hypotheses that other courts within the bankruptcy
judicial structure are more likely to cite to BAP opinions (with the
exception of Hypothesis 6), we further hypothesize that the underlying
motivations prompting such citation practices will also lead these
courts to discuss BAP opinions in greater detail and to cite to BAP
opinions with more immediacy. We thus propose Hypotheses 9 and 10.
We now turn to evidence from the findings of our study and use
that evidence to evaluate our hypotheses empirically.
III.EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE PERCEIVED QUALITY OF APPELLATE
REVIEW: EVIDENCE FROM APPELLATE BANKRUPTCY OPINIONS
This Part presents the results of our empirical study of
appellate bankruptcy opinions issued both at the first-tier and secondtier levels of appellate review in the bankruptcy judicial system. We
test the hypotheses discussed above in Part II.B through the use of
quantitative methodology and look for patterns that point to a
relationship between the type of appellate court and the manner in
which others perceive the quality of review provided by the court. In
doing so, we seek to evaluate the theoretical assumptions that have
evolved regarding those attributes considered to improve the quality
of appellate review. We emphasize, however, that we do not purport to
provide either a definitive or exhaustive account. We readily admit
that we have chosen to study a narrow set of data from a snapshot in
time that is not necessarily representative of the general universe of
bankruptcy appeals. Aware of these limitations, we nonetheless have
strong convictions that a great deal of valuable information can be
gleaned from the data and that this information will help guide future
discussions. Ultimately, our goal is to begin a shift away from
generalization and abstraction and to generate a more concrete

114. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
115. See supra fig.1.
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understanding of how differences in appellate structure affect the
quality of appellate review.
This Part proceeds as follows. Part III.A sets forth the selection
criteria used to constitute the sample for our study, discusses the
major variables that we studied and incorporated into our statistical
models, and details the general characteristics of the sample. Part
III.B presents descriptive statistics comparing perceptions of the
quality of appellate review provided by BAPs with perceptions of the
quality of appellate review provided by district courts. Part III.C
presents the central findings from our regression models, and Part
III.D interprets our results.
If those attributes identified as improving the quality of
appellate review truly do so, we would expect to see a positive
relationship between BAP opinions and their perceived quality.
Furthermore, we would expect this relationship to be stronger than
the relationship, if any, between district court opinions and their
perceived quality. In summary, we find that the rates at which courts
of appeals affirm appeals from BAPs and district courts provide
support for the claim that BAPs are perceived to provide a better
quality of review than the district courts. Furthermore, data on
subsequent citation by federal courts to the opinions rendered on
appeal by BAPs and district courts lend considerable support to the
claim. Given the possible impact of selection effects on the affirmance
data as opposed to the citation data, we consider the strongly robust
results we observe in the citation context to be more informative.
A. Sample Selection and Variables of Interest
1. Sample Selection
To constitute the sample of appellate bankruptcy opinions for
this study, we formulated a search query in Westlaw’s FBKR-CS
database, which contains reported and unreported case law documents
(i.e., decisions and orders) relating to bankruptcy that were issued by
various courts—including the Supreme Court, circuit courts of
appeals, BAPs, district courts, and bankruptcy courts.116 Because we
sought to create two separate databases, one for first-tier appellate
dispositions by BAPs and district courts (the “first-tier database”) and
one for second-tier appellate dispositions by courts of appeals (the

116. Reported case law documents are those released for publication in West Federal
Reporters.
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“second-tier database”), we ran two separate search queries. The first
query consisted of the single term “11 U.S.C.,” the standard citation to
title 11 of the United States Code (commonly referred to as the
“Bankruptcy Code”), coupled with (1) a date restriction that limited
query retrieval to decisions and orders issued during the three-year
period beginning on October 1, 1997 and ending on September 30,
2000;117 and (2) a field restriction that limited query retrieval to
decisions and orders whose preliminary field contained either the term
“district court” or “bankruptcy appellate panel,” but not “court of
appeals.”118 The second query mirrored the first query with the
exception that the field restriction limited query retrieval to decisions
and orders whose preliminary field only contained the term “court of
appeals.”119 The first query produced 1,487 documents, while the
second query produced 871 documents. These large numbers clearly
presented a challenge by virtue of the time it would take to review
each document. We sought to reduce the time demand by randomly
selecting for review approximately one-quarter of the documents
produced by each search query—specifically, 372 documents from the
first search query and 218 documents from the second search query.120
In order to identify those that would be selected for inclusion and
analysis in the two databases, we reviewed these documents according
to the procedures described below.
We sought to include in the databases appeals that involved
the resolution of dispositions rendered by bankruptcy courts in core
proceedings.121 We included only those documents that disposed of the
appeal on the merits. (Because most of these documents were opinions
rather than orders, for ease of reference we will collectively refer to
the documents as opinions for the remainder of the Article.) Opinions
that solely involved procedural dispositions (e.g., dismissal for lack of
117. Coverage for the FBKR-CS database begins with the year 1789.
118. The preliminary field for case law documents (i.e., decisions or orders issued by a court)
in Westlaw is found at the top of such documents and generally contains the name of the court
that issued the document. In its entirety, the first search query was as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr
(“district court” “bankruptcy appellate panel” % “court of appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef
10/01/2000).
119. In its entirety, the second search query was as follows: “11 u.s.c.” & pr (“court of
appeals”) & da (aft 9/30/1997 & bef 10/01/2000).
120. Each search query produced a numbered result list in which the opinions were listed in
reverse chronological order. For the first-tier database, the results were organized by court in
reverse chronological order (i.e., district court opinions were listed first in reverse chronological
order followed by BAP opinions listed in reverse chronological order). We used a random number
generator to select the opinions from each result list that we would analyze. For each result list,
we randomly generated a set of unique numbers falling within the range of the total documents
retrieved by the search query.
121. See supra notes 49–50 and accompanying text.
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jurisdiction) were excluded. In most instances, each opinion generated
one observation. However, some opinions generated multiple
observations. For example, some opinions resolved multiple appeals in
separate and unrelated bankruptcy cases. In other instances, an
opinion would resolve an appeal of separate orders that were entered
by the bankruptcy court in distinct proceedings within the same case.
Finally, by virtue of the identical date restriction included in both
search queries, each opinion was issued during one of three
government fiscal years: 1998, 1999, or 2000.122
Pursuant to these selection procedures, our first-tier database
consists of 268 observations drawn from 264 opinions,123 4 of which
produced a second observation. Our second-tier database consists of
170 observations drawn from 165 opinions,124 5 of which produced a
second observation. Not surprisingly, for both databases, the majority
of appeals wended their way through the district courts rather than
the BAPs—although more so for appeals in the second-tier database
(approximately 81%) than the first-tier database (approximately 60%).

122. We tailored our search in this manner for two reasons. First, we wanted to facilitate
comparisons of our data with official government data regarding bankruptcy appeals. Generally,
such data track the government’s fiscal year, which begins on October 1st and ends on
September 30th, rather than the calendar year.
Second, we chose the specific time period for this study in order to capture the BAP
experience at its apex in terms of participating circuits. BAPs did not become a fixture of the
bankruptcy judicial system until 1996. The enactment of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 amended
the Judicial Code to permit, but not require, the establishment of BAPs on a circuit-by-circuit
basis. Only the First and Ninth Circuits chose to do so, establishing their BAPs in 1979 and
1980, respectively. In the wake of the Marathon decision, however, the First Circuit concluded
that continued operation of a BAP would be inappropriate until Congress remedied the defects in
the constitutionally infirm, bankruptcy jurisdictional scheme. Massachusetts v. Dartmouth
House Nursing Home, Inc., 726 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1984).
The Ninth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Briney v. Burley (In re Burley), 738 F.2d
981 (9th Cir. 1984), holding that circuit court supervision of the BAP satisfied Marathon’s
requirement of Article III judicial review. Despite the measures taken by Congress in 1984
through the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act to address the Marathon
decision, the First Circuit Judicial Council chose not to reauthorize its BAP, thus leaving the
Ninth Circuit as the only circuit with an operating BAP. This state of affairs changed with the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, which amended the Judicial Code to require the judicial council
of each circuit to create a BAP absent a finding by the council that (1) insufficient judicial
resources in the circuit would preclude its establishment, or (2) that establishment of a BAP
would produce undue delay or increased cost to parties in bankruptcy cases. Pub. L. No. 103-394,
§ 104(c)(3), 108 Stat. 4106, 4109 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1)). Prompted into action by this
amendment, in 1996 the First Circuit reauthorized and the Second, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth
Circuits established BAPs. The Second Circuit BAP, however, ceased operations on July 1, 2000.
123. Thus, our selection criteria reduced the random sample of documents relating to the
first-tier database by approximately 18%.
124. Similar to the first-tier database, see supra note 123, our selection criteria reduced the
random sample of documents relating to the second-tier database by approximately 17%.
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The distributions of opinions by circuit in each database roughly
approximate one another.125
As stated before, we do not seek in our study to make claims
about the unobserved population of bankruptcy appeals but rather
confine our commentary to the observed sample of data we have
amassed. That said, we recognize that the story we seek to tell may
not be as compelling if selection bias accounts for the results that we
present. Accordingly, we seek to alleviate concerns regarding two
major types of potential selection bias stemming from litigant choices
that could produce a distorted picture: (1) case-selection bias and (2)
forum-selection bias.
It has been theorized that cases adjudicated at the trial level
represent a nonrandom group by virtue of litigant choices.126 For a
host of reasons, litigants may choose only a select group of cases for
which to pursue a final adjudication by a trial court. If tried cases
substantively differ from settled cases, a study that focuses solely on
tried cases will misrepresent the larger world of litigation because
most cases settle.127 An appeal further exacerbates the selection bias
because (1) not all adjudicated cases are appealed and (2) not all
appealed cases are disposed of by court decision. The bankruptcy
appellate structure doubly compounds the problem given the two
levels of intermediate appellate review.
If these assumptions are correct, should they be of overriding
concern in a study such as ours? We think not for the following
reasons. First, case-selection bias should not impact our citation data
insofar as a court is generally constrained to written opinions when it
chooses those opinions to which it cites. Second, cases settled either at
the trial or at the appellate level are not a relevant population for
purposes of our study. Our study asks whether the circuit court will
perceive the BAP to have performed the appellate function better than
the district court. Because circuit courts are not autonomous
decisionmaking bodies and can only resolve those appeals brought
before them by the litigants, the only cases that can and should be
measured for this purpose are those cases actually appealed to and

125. See infra Appendix tbl.1.
126. See, e.g., George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13
J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1984).
127. According to a recent empirical study, approximately 2% of federal civil lawsuits in 2002
ended in trial. Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related
Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 463 tbl.1 (2004). The
bankruptcy analogue of a federal civil lawsuit is an adversary proceeding. See supra note 45. In
2002, approximately 5% of adversary proceedings terminated during or after trial. Elizabeth
Warren, Vanishing Trials: The New Age of American Law, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 915, 930 (2005).
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resolved by the circuit courts.128 Last, Professor Frank Cross’s
comprehensive empirical study of decisionmaking by the courts of
appeals has documented that litigant effects are not a major
determinant of circuit court decisions, both generally and in particular
types of cases (i.e., criminal decisions and labor decisions).129
We also recognize that our data potentially include a forumselection bias because attorneys in circuits that have BAPs may be
more likely to prefer appeals relating to certain subject matters to be
heard by BAPs than by district courts, or vice versa.130 Thus, it is
possible that there are some issues that BAPs never or only rarely
hear. (Assuming that bankruptcy cases are at some level homogenous
nationwide, that will not be the case for district courts, because there
are circuits in which district courts hear substantially all appeals from
bankruptcy court rulings.) More generally, it is possible that BAP and
district court dockets vary substantially. While we cannot eliminate
this possibility, we have looked for evidence of such a bias and have
found no such evidence.131 Thus, while recognizing that such a bias
128. Even if the group of appeals resolved by the circuit courts are nonrandom such that our
results would not hold if the circuit courts also decided those cases that were not appealed
beyond the first level of intermediate review, such theorizing is an exercise in futility. Simply
put, we cannot measure the outcomes of circuit court decisions that do not exist. In other words,
because we look to measure quality of appellate review that the circuit court perceives, we ought
not to fret about those cases that will never see light of day in the circuit court.
129. CROSS, supra note 95, at 123–47.
130. Because the Judicial Code mandates that, in circuits with BAPs, bankruptcy appeals
will be heard by the BAP unless one of the parties to the appeal elects to have the district court
hear the appeal, 28 U.S.C. § 158(c)(1) (2000 & Supp. V 2005), the dynamic of any potential
selection bias at work in the BAP perhaps should be understood as the product of the subset of
appeals where the forum preferences of the parties to the appeal have aligned. Although there
could be instances where all parties prefer to have the appeal heard by the district court, there
would also be instances where only one party had such a preference. Thus, a BAP docket is
unique in that all of its appeals theoretically involve litigants with a consistent forum preference.
We say “theoretically” since it is conceivable that a party with an inconsistent forum preference
may have failed, in a timely fashion, to elect a district court to hear the appeal.
131. Because we do not differentiate between district courts from circuits with BAPs (BAP
circuits) and those from circuits without BAPs (non-BAP circuits) in our analyses, there is
concern that any potential selection bias at work in BAP circuits could be masked by those
observations from non-BAP circuits. Approximately 31% of the observations in the first-tier
database and 36% of the observations in the second-tier database consisted of district court
opinions from non-BAP circuits. See infra Appendix tbl.1. We conducted bivariate statistical
analyses to ascertain whether selection bias existed in the BAP circuits by focusing on those
circumstances in which one would expect to see such bias have a disproportionate effect—
namely, (1) the subject matter of the appeal and (2) affirmance rates by the court of appeals. For
neither of these circumstances did we find evidence of selection bias.
First, we examined whether a statistically significant relationship exists in BAP circuits
between the subject matter of the appeal and the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal. To
do so, we classified observations according to whether the subject of the appeal fell into one of the
four most frequently occurring subjects of appeal heard by first-tier appellate courts. For the
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may lurk at more refined levels of case-type delineation, we are at
least confident that the size of any forum-selection bias is confined,
not pernicious, and thus probably has not had a meaningful effect
upon our data and analysis.132

first-tier database, for all observations, and for those observations from BAP circuits, the four
most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge, procedure/jurisdiction,
avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the second-tier database, for all observations and for
those observations from BAP circuits, the four most frequently occurring subjects were matters
relating to discharge, claims, avoiding powers, and multiple subjects. For the first-tier database,
approximately 56% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits as well as all district
courts combined involve one of the four most frequently occurring subjects. For the second-tier
database, approximately 64% of the appeals heard by district courts in BAP circuits and 59% of
the appeals heard by all district courts combined involve one of the four most frequently
occurring subjects. After applying a chi-square test with one degree of freedom, we found no
statistically significant relationship in BAP circuits between the subject matter of the appeal and
the first-tier appellate court to hear the appeal (a p-value of 0.288 for the first-tier database and
a p-value of 0.876 for the second-tier database).
Second, for all observations in the first-tier database, we examine whether a statistically
significant relationship exists between the subject matter of the appeal and whether there is a
subsequent appeal to the circuit court. Again, we classify observations according to whether the
subject of the appeal fell into one of the four most frequently occurring subject matter
categories. For those observations involving subsequent appeal to the circuit court,
approximately 62% involved a top subject matter category. For those observations without circuit
court review, approximately 56% involved a top subject matter category. Applying a chi-square
test with one degree of freedom, we found no statistically significant relationship (p = 0.475)
between the subject matter of the appeal and subsequent appeal to the circuit court.
Finally, we found that courts of appeals affirm district courts in BAP circuits at a rate
similar to that of their counterparts in non-BAP circuits. In the first-tier database, there were 77
observations for which there was a subsequent appeal to the court of appeals. The subsequent
history for 10 of those observations, however, already existed in the second-tier database (i.e., the
circuit court opinion from the second-tier database reviewed an opinion from the first-tier
database). When combining the 67 unique observations from the first-tier database involving a
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals with the 170 observations in the second-tier database,
courts of appeals partly or fully affirmed district courts in BAP circuits approximately 77% of the
time and partly or fully affirmed district courts in non-BAP circuits approximately 71% of the
time. Bivariate analysis confirms that no statistically significant difference exists between the
rate at which courts of appeals partly or fully affirmed district courts from BAP circuits and
district courts from non-BAP circuits (chi-squared = 0.9094, df = 1, p = 0.340). Furthermore, if
one considers only those observations where the court of appeals fully affirmed district courts,
the affirmance rates in BAP and non-BAP circuits are similar. The circuit court affirmance rate
of district court dispositions in BAP circuits was approximately 67% in comparison to 65% in
non-BAP circuits. Bivariate analysis confirms that this difference is not statistically significant
(chi-squared = 0.1419, df = 1, p = 0.706).
132. With respect to citations, if there is a forum-selection bias, then the BAPs are not
deciding some categories of cases—and, perhaps, certain issues—that the district courts are.
This logically should translate into an increase in citations to district court opinions as compared
to BAP opinions, since other courts facing such issues and wishing to include citations will have
no opportunity to cite to any BAP opinions. Yet, as we discuss below, our data analyses generally
show that BAP citations are favored. In short, if there is a selection bias, then our statistical
analyses, if anything, understate the extent to which BAP citations are favored.
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2. Variables of Interest
Recall that we sought to test our broad inquiry into the
perceived quality of appellate review by focusing on (1) how two
distinct appellate courts in the bankruptcy judicial system—the BAPs
and district courts—perform their error-finding function and (2) how
other judicial actors perceive the quality of that performance. As our
hypotheses indicate, we concerned ourselves with an array of
dependent variables that fall within one of two categories:
(1) affirmance by the court of appeals and (2) citations by other federal
courts to the appellate opinions issued by BAPs and district courts.
We will discuss each category and the variables associated with each
in turn.
First, we tracked the disposition rendered by the BAP or
district court on appeal according to three ordered outcomes:
(1) “negative” for those dispositions where the reviewing court
reversed, remanded, or vacated the disposition rendered below;
(2) “hybrid” for those dispositions where the reviewing court partly
affirmed the disposition rendered below; and (3) “positive” for those
dispositions where the reviewing court fully affirmed the disposition
rendered below.133 We define circuit court affirmance in two ways:
broadly and narrowly. Broadly defined, affirmance occurred when the
circuit court either partly or fully affirmed the disposition rendered by
the first-tier appellate court (i.e., those observations with hybrid or
positive outcomes).134 Narrowly defined, affirmance occurred only
when the circuit court fully affirmed the disposition rendered by the
first-tier appellate court (i.e., those observations with positive
outcomes).135 Second, in order to document citation data to the
opinions in our databases, we relied upon KeyCite, West’s citation
research service.136 We documented for each first-tier level opinion all

133. For the frequency of the dispositions rendered on appeal in first-tier and second-tier
level opinions, see infra Appendix tbl.2.
134. As set forth below, we denominate this variable “Affirmance.” See infra text
accompanying notes 150–151.
135. As set forth below, we denominate this variable “Full Affirmance.” See id.
136. KeyCite organizes citing references for a case by segregating negative citing references
from positive citing references. KeyCite further organizes negative and positive citing references
according to the depth of treatment given by the citing reference to the cited opinion. Four
categories exist for the depth of treatment provided by the citing reference: (1) “examined,”
indicating that the citing reference contains an extended discussion of the cited opinion, usually
more than a printed page of text; (2) “discussed,” indicating that the citing reference contains a
substantial discussion of the cited opinion, usually more than a paragraph but less than a
printed page; (3) “cited,” indicating that the citing reference contains some discussion of the cited
opinion, usually less than a paragraph; and (4) “mentioned,” indicating that the citing reference
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positive citations made to it by any federal court—aside from those
citations made in connection with the direct appellate history of the
opinion—during the five-year period following the date that the
opinion was issued. Pursuant to these criteria, approximately 75% of
the first-tier appellate opinions had citing references. We further
documented (1) citations by type of court, (2) citations by depth of
treatment, (3) citations directly quoting the cited opinion, and (4) the
immediacy with which first-tier appellate opinions were cited.137
The major explanatory variables (i.e., independent variables) in
the databases include (1) whether the BAP or district court heard the
initial appeal, (2) whether the appellant was solely the debtor in
whose case the appeal arose, (3) whether the appellee was solely the
debtor in whose case the appeal arose, (4) whether the appeal arose in
the context of a case filed under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code,
(5) whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was filed
by an individual, (6) whether the type of dispute proceeding within
which the appeal arose was an adversary proceeding or contested
matter, and (7) the subject matter of the appeal.
B. Bivariate Descriptive Statistics
Our primary interest lies in the statistical relationship
between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and various
dependent variables: (1) affirmance by the court of appeals, (2) the
number of positive federal court citations to the opinion issued by the
first-tier appellate court, (3) the depth of treatment given to first-tier
appellate opinions when positively cited by other federal courts, (4)
direct quotation of the first-tier appellate opinion by positive citing
references, and (5) the immediacy with which the first-tier appellate
opinion is positively cited. By searching for a statistically significant
relationship between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and
each of these dependent variables, we can look for those relationships
warranting further inquiry through regression analysis that will
confirm the existence of the relationship when controlling for other
factors.
Hypothesis 1 posits that courts of appeals more likely will
uphold the dispositions rendered on appeal by BAPs than those
rendered by district courts. Our data support this hypothesis. In the

contains a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation. Finally, KeyCite
identifies citing references that directly quote the cited opinion.
137. For citation data for those first-tier appellate opinions with positive citing references,
see infra Appendix tbl.3.
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first-tier database, there were 77 observations for which there was a
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals.138 The subsequent history
for 10 of those observations, however, already existed in the secondtier database (i.e., the circuit court opinion from the second-tier
database reviewed an opinion from the first-tier database). Combining
the 67 unique observations in the first-tier database involving a
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals with the 170 observations in
the second-tier database, we generated a database of 237 observations
for purposes of analyzing circuit court affirmance rates of first-tier
appellate dispositions (the “affirmance database”). When defining
affirmance broadly to include those dispositions where the circuit
court either partly or fully affirmed the first-tier appellate court, the
court of appeals affirmed BAPs approximately 91% of the time as
opposed to 74% for district courts.139 If no association had existed
between the type of first-tier appellate court to have initially decided
the appeal and the disposition rendered on subsequent appeal by the
court of appeals, we would have expected to see first-tier appellate
dispositions partly or fully affirmed by the court of appeals
approximately 78% of the time. Our analysis confirms that there is
less than a 0.01 probability that random chance alone would have
yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed. Similarly, when
defining affirmance narrowly to include only those dispositions where
the circuit court fully affirmed the first-tier appellate court, the court
of appeals affirmed BAPs approximately 81% of the time as opposed to
66% for district courts.140 If no association had existed between the
138. Of the 77 observations in the first-tier database for which there was a subsequent
appeal to the court of appeals, 50 were district court dispositions and 27 were BAP dispositions.
As there were a total of 162 district court and 106 BAP dispositions in the first-tier database,
infra Appendix tbl.1, approximately 31% of the district court dispositions and 25% of the BAP
dispositions involved subsequent appeal. As our first-tier database only includes opinions that
disposed of the appeal on the merits, these figures seem to be consistent with empirical evidence
that has estimated that up to a third of first-tier appellate dispositions rendered on the merits
have been further appealed to the court of appeals. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at
630; see also U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT, STATISTICAL
REPORT: JANUARY 1, 2005 – DECEMBER 31, 2005 (2005), available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/
newbap/stats/q4-05.pdf (documenting that approximately 30% of bankruptcy appeals in the
Eighth Circuit in 2005 were taken to the U.S. Court of Appeals).
139. The 91% circuit court affirmance rate of BAP dispositions approximates the rate at
which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit partly or fully affirmed merit-based BAP
dispositions—that is, 90%—during the eleven-year period beginning on July 1, 1996 and ending
on June 30, 2007. See U.S. BANKRUPTCY APPELLATE PANEL FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT, ANNUAL
REPORT OF BANKRUPTCY APPEALS IN PARTICIPATING BAP DISTRICTS FOR THE STATISTICAL YEAR
JULY 1, 2006 – JUNE 30, 2007 (INCLUDING DISPOSITION STATISTICS FOR APPEALS DISPOSED OF
SINCE JULY 1, 1996) 8 (2007), available at http://www.bap10.uscourts.gov/stats/2007.pdf.
140. The 81% full affirmance rate of BAP dispositions by circuit courts approximates the rate
at which the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit fully affirmed merit-based BAP
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type of first-tier appellate court and circuit court affirmance, we would
have expected to see first-tier appellate dispositions fully affirmed by
the court of appeals approximately 70% of the time. Our analysis
confirms that there is less than a 0.05 probability that random chance
alone would have yielded a difference as large as the one witnessed.141
Hypotheses 2 through 7 generally predict that, with the
exception of district courts, other federal courts will positively cite to
BAP opinions more than they positively cite to district court opinions.
For district courts, we hypothesize that they will cite more often to
district court opinions than BAP opinions. Finally, we predict that
extracircuit citations to BAP opinions will exceed extracircuit citations
to district court opinions. As an initial matter, BAP opinions had a
higher propensity to be positively cited by other federal courts than
district court opinions. Approximately 91% of the BAP opinions in the
first-tier database had been positively cited by federal courts, whereas
slightly less than two-thirds (65%) of the district court opinions had
received similar treatment. In the absence of a relationship between
the type of first-tier appellate opinion and positive citation thereto by
other federal courts, we would have expected to see approximately
three-quarters (75%) of the first-tier appellate opinions positively
cited. Our analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.0001
probability that random chance alone would have yielded a difference
as large as the one witnessed. It would thus appear that the type of
first-tier appellate opinion has some influence on a federal court’s
decision to cite that opinion.
We can further elaborate on this relationship by examining the
number of citing references to the opinions according to the type of
federal court making the citing reference. We note that 53% of the
observations in the first-tier database that have positive citing
references are district court opinions.142 Assuming a random, or at

dispositions—that is, approximately 89%—during the ten-year period beginning on July 1, 1996,
and ending on June 30, 2006. Id.
141. For the details of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.4.
142. The first-tier database contained 202 observations in which a federal court positively
cited to the opinion issued by the first-tier appellate court. In conducting our bivariate analyses,
we exclude extreme outliers (i.e., those observations involving extreme values in the tails of the
distribution of the positive citing reference data). We define an extreme outlier to be any
observation with a total number of positive citations that falls above the third quartile of the
positive citing reference data (7 citations) by more than three times the interquartile range for
such data (5 citations). See infra Appendix tbl.3 (describing distribution of positive citing
references to first-tier opinions). Accordingly, we excluded any observations with more than 22
positive citing references. Pursuant to this measure, we eliminated 2 observations from our
analysis—both BAP opinions—leaving us with a total of 200 observations for analysis.
Accordingly, approximately 99% of the first-tier appellate opinions in our sample that were cited
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least somewhat random, distribution of issues and factual settings, we
would expect citation rates to favor district court opinions slightly.143
Our data, however, generally show that citation rates favor BAP
opinions. Specifically, we find strong differences between the BAP and
district court samples that are statistically significant at both the
mean and the median. For example, a BAP opinion that was positively
cited had, on average, approximately 7 citations by other federal
courts, whereas a district court opinion averaged approximately 3
citations. Furthermore, by disaggregating our citation data according
to the type of federal court that cited the first-tier appellate opinion,
we find that the BAP opinions in our study had a statistically
significantly greater number of citing references by courts of appeals,
BAPs, and bankruptcy courts than did district court opinions. On the
other hand, district court opinions had a statistically significantly
greater number of citing references by other district courts than did
BAP opinions. Finally, the data indicate that extracircuit federal
courts cited more to BAP opinions than to district court opinions and
that the difference is statistically significant. Some of these results are
illustrated below in Figure 2.144

positively by other federal courts are included in our bivariate analyses of the citing reference
data.
143. Cf. Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations, supra note 104, at 403 (arguing that the
larger number of citations by the California Supreme Court to opinions issued by the courts of
New York State may be due to the large case literature arising out of New York).
144. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
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FIGURE 2
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY CITING REFERENCE TYPE
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Additional evidence of the perceived correctness of the first-tier
appellate opinions can be gleaned from examining the depth of
treatment provided to those opinions by the federal courts that cited to
them. Hypothesis 8 predicts that the citing references to BAP opinions
will have afforded a greater depth of treatment than district court
opinions. Our data generally support this hypothesis. We find that, at
both the median and the mean, BAP opinions had a statistically
significant higher number of citing references by other federal courts
that cited (i.e., provided discussion of less than a paragraph) and
discussed (i.e., provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less
than a printed page) the opinion.145 We also find that, at the median,
BAP opinions had a statistically significant higher number of citing
references by other federal courts that mentioned the opinion (i.e.,
contained a brief reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string
145. For purposes of this analysis, we once again exclude extreme outliers according to the
criteria discussed in supra note 142.
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citation). We do not find, however, either at the median or the mean,
any association between the type of first-tier appellate opinion and the
number of positive citing references that examine the opinion (i.e.,
contain an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than
a printed page of text). Figure 3 illustrates some of these results.146
FIGURE 3
AVERAGE NUMBER OF POSITIVE CITING REFERENCES TO
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINION BY DEPTH OF TREATMENT
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We tracked the number of citing references that directly quoted
the first-tier appellate opinion as yet another metric for evaluating the
perceived correctness of the first-tier appellate opinions in our study.
First, we find evidence to support our hypothesis that a greater
likelihood exists that positive federal citing references will have
quoted BAP opinions as opposed to district court opinions.
Approximately 65% of the federal courts that positively cited BAP
opinions also directly quoted those opinions, whereas only 38% of
district court opinions with positive federal citing references were
directly quoted. If no relationship existed between the type of first-tier
146. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.

NASHPARDO_PAGE

1790

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:6:1745

appellate opinion and positive direct quotation thereto by other federal
courts, we would have expected to see slightly more than half (51%) of
the first-tier appellate opinions to have been quoted directly. Our
analysis confirms that there is less than a 0.0001 probability that
random chance alone would have yielded a difference as large as this,
thus indicating a statistically significant association between the type
of first-tier appellate opinion and a federal court’s decision to quote
the opinion directly when positively citing to it. Furthermore, we
observe that, on average, approximately 1.5 of the positive citing
references to BAP opinions directly quote such opinions as opposed to
only 0.58 of the positive citing references to district court opinions.
Also, whereas 65% of the positively cited BAP opinions have at least
one directly quoting citing reference, only 39% of the positively cited
district court opinions did so. These differences are highly statistically
significant and further support our contention that positive federal
citing references will have directly quoted BAP opinions more
frequently than district court opinions.147
Finally, the immediacy with which a federal court cites to such
an opinion serves as yet another indicator of its perceived quality.
Accordingly, we consider the period of time for which it took a first-tier
appellate opinion to be positively cited by a federal court for the first
time.148 Our data show that, for the group of positively cited first-tier
appellate opinions, a BAP opinion would receive its first positive citing
reference by another federal court, on average, within approximately
10 months (306 days), while it took nearly twice as long—
approximately 17 months (533 days)—for a district court opinion.
Moreover, slightly more than half (51%) of the BAP opinions from this
group received their first positive citation within approximately a 6month period. This starkly contrasts with district court opinions, only
about a quarter (24%) of which received their first positive citation
within the same period of time. These highly statistically significant
differences indicate that the type of first-tier appellate opinion has
147. For purposes of these analyses, we excluded extreme outliers according to the criteria
discussed in supra note 142. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
148. We might assume that an opinion that comprehensively and effectively addresses an
unresolved or debated issue of law that has been repeatedly litigated not only will be heavily
cited, but also will be cited more quickly. Thus, for purposes of this analysis, we exclude the
extreme outliers we identified with respect to total number of positive citing references. See
supra note 142. We further sought to identify whether there were any extreme outliers in terms
of the number of days it took for the first-tier appellate opinions to be cited. In this instance, we
define an extreme outlier to be any observation with a total number of days that falls above the
third quartile of the immediacy data (638 days) by more than 3 times the interquartile range for
such data (520.5 days). On the basis of these parameters, there were no additional extreme
outliers.
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some association with the time within which the opinion will garner
its first positive citation by another federal court.149
In summary, based on the affirmance rates of courts of appeals
on subsequent review of BAP and district court opinions, we find that
courts of appeals perceive BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate
review than district courts. Moreover, based on citations to the
opinions issued by BAPs and district courts, we find strong evidence
that most nonreviewing federal courts perceive the quality of BAP
opinions to be better. We now look to confirm whether these
associations will persist when controlling for other potential
explanatory variables and, if so, we attempt to measure the strength
of such associations.
C. Regression Analyses
Here, we seek to provide a more comprehensive analysis of the
perceived quality of appellate review by constructing a series of
regression models that will test whether the statistically significant
relationships we identified in Part III.B persist when controlling for
the independent variables discussed in Part III.A.
1. Circuit Court Affirmance
For the 237 observations in the affirmance database,150 we used
a logistic regression model to predict the binary dependent variable of
circuit court affirmance (no affirmance coded 0 and affirmance coded
1), both broadly and narrowly defined (respectively, Affirmance and
Full Affirmance),151 based on the following independent variables:
whether the first-tier appellate court was a district court (coded
0) or a BAP (coded 1) (Court);
whether the appeal arose within the context of an adversary
proceeding (coded 0) or a contested matter (coded 1) (Dispute
Type);
the fiscal year in which the first-tier appellate court issued its
opinion (for which we created three indicator variables with the
response categories 0 for those opinions issued outside of the

149. For a full accounting of these results, see infra Appendix tbl.5.
150. See supra Part III.A.2.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 134–135.
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fiscal year in question and 1 for those opinions issued during the
fiscal year in question) (Fiscal Year);152
whether the first-tier appellate court had published its
disposition (negative responses coded 0 and positive responses
coded 1) (Published);
whether the only party to appeal to the first-tier level court was
the debtor (negative responses coded 0 and positive responses
coded 1) (Appellant);
whether the debtor was the only party appearing as an appellee
at the first-tier level of review (negative responses coded 0 and
positive responses coded 1) (Appellee);
whether the appeal arose in the context of a Chapter 7 case
(negative responses coded 0 and positive responses coded 1)
(Chapter 7);
whether the bankruptcy case in which the appeal arose was
that of an individual debtor (negative responses coded 0 and
positive responses coded 1) (Debtor Type); and
whether the subject of the appeal could be classified as falling
into one of the four most frequently occurring subjects of appeal
heard by first-tier appellate courts for which there was
subsequent appeal to the court of appeals (negative responses
coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) (Subject).153
According to the model, even when controlling for other
potential explanatory variables, the type of first-tier appellate court to
have initially determined the appeal remains a statistically significant
predictor of Affirmance and Full Affirmance by the court of appeals.154
The model indicates that the shift from the district court to the BAP
as the first-tier appellate court made the odds of Affirmance 3.95
[1.41, 11.07] times higher and the odds of Full Affirmance 2.54 [1.12,
152. The opinions in the database were issued during one of three government fiscal years—
1998, 1999, or 2000. See supra note 122 and accompanying text. The reference category was firsttier opinions issued during the 2000 fiscal year and was accordingly excluded from the model.
153. The four most frequently occurring subjects were matters relating to discharge (24%),
multiple subjects (17%), avoiding powers (10%), and procedure/jurisdiction (9%).
154. Both the Court and Published variables are significant predictors of Affirmance and
Full Affirmance. The Appellant, Appellee, and Subject variables are significant predictors of Full
Affirmance (but not Affirmance). For detailed results from this regression model, see infra
Appendix tbl.6.
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5.74] times higher.155 Put another way, holding all other variables
constant, a first-tier appellate disposition rendered by a BAP
increased the odds of Affirmance by 295% [41, 1007] and Full
Affirmance by 154% [12, 474].
It is helpful to elucidate these findings in terms of predicted
probabilities. Using the actual values of all of the independent
variables included in the model, we can calculate the predicted
probability of circuit court affirmance for the 237 first-tier appellate
dispositions upon which the model is based. In Figures 4 and 5 below,
we present the predicted probabilities for Affirmance and Full
Affirmance, respectively, of the actual observations in our regression
model through use of a histogram that displays the distribution of
those probabilities for district court dispositions and BAP dispositions
separately. The width of each bar represents a specific interval of
predicted probability of affirmance, and the height of each bar
represents the percentage of dispositions that fall within that interval.
For any observation with a predicted probability of over 50% (i.e.,
greater than 0.5), the model assigned the positive outcome of circuit
court affirmance.

155. When performing inference, we implement the recommended practice of conveying
levels of uncertainty by using the notation [#, #] to indicate the lower and upper bounds of the
95% confidence interval around our estimates. See Lee Epstein, Andrew D. Martin & Matthew
M. Schneider, On the Effective Communication of the Results of Empirical Studies, Part I, 59
VAND. L. REV. 1811, 1835–37 (2006).
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FIGURE 4
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR AFFIRMANCE
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First, we find that, when holding other variables at their mean,
a BAP disposition is predicted to have a 93% [86, 99] chance of being
either partly or fully affirmed by the court of appeals in contrast to
77% [70, 84] for district court dispositions. Thus, when holding other
variables at their mean, the likelihood of partial or full affirmance by
the court of appeals is predicted to increase by 16 [7, 25] percentage
points when it reviews BAP dispositions. Second, we find that, when
holding other variables at their mean, a BAP disposition is predicted
to have an 85% [76, 95] chance of being fully affirmed by the court of
appeals in contrast to 69% [62, 77] for district court dispositions. Thus,
when holding other variables at their mean, the likelihood of full
affirmance by the court of appeals is similarly predicted to increase by
16 [4, 28] percentage points when it reviews BAP dispositions. These
findings support our hypothesis that courts of appeals will more likely
uphold the dispositions rendered by BAPs than those rendered by
district courts.
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FIGURE 5
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR FULL AFFIRMANCE
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2. Positive Citing References by Other Federal Courts
To further explore (1) the decision of federal courts to cite
positively to the opinions issued by first-tier appellate courts, (2) the
extent to which they do so, (3) the manner in which they do so, and (4)
the immediacy with which they do so, we construct a series of binary
logistic regression models as well as various count regression models
(e.g., negative binomial and Poisson). First, we examine whether the
association between the identity of the first-tier appellate court and
positive citation to its opinion persists when controlling for other
factors. For all 286 observations in the first-tier database, we use a
binary logistic regression model to predict whether a federal court will
have cited positively to the first-tier appellate opinion (coding opinions
with no positive citations as 0 and coding opinions with at least one
positive citation as 1) based on the following independent variables:
(1) Court; (2) whether the first-tier appellate court fully affirmed the
disposition rendered by the bankruptcy court (negative responses
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coded 0 and positive responses coded 1) (First-Tier Full Affirmance);
(3) Published; (4) Appellant; (5) Appellee; (6) Chapter 7; (7) Debtor
Type; (8) Dispute Type; (9) Subject; (10) whether the first-tier court’s
disposition was subsequently appealed to the court of appeals
(negative responses coded 0 and positive responses coded 1)
(Subsequent Appeal); and (11) Fiscal Year.
The model identifies the type of first-tier appellate court to
have initially determined the appeal as a statistically significant
predictor of whether the court’s opinion will have been positively cited
by another federal court.156 Figure 6 below illustrates the predicted
probability of positive citation to the first-tier appellate opinion based
on the actual values of all of the independent variables included in the
model.

FIGURE 6
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR POSITIVE CITATION OF
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY FEDERAL COURTS
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156. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.7.
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We find that, when holding other variables at their mean, a
BAP opinion is predicted to have a 90% [84, 97] chance of being
positively cited by another federal court in contrast to 73% [65, 81] for
district court opinions. Accordingly, when holding other variables at
their mean, the likelihood of positive citation to a first-tier appellate
opinion by another federal court is predicted to increase by 17 [7, 27]
percentage points for BAP opinions. These data support our
hypothesis that, if a BAP issued the first-tier appellate opinion, it will
increase the chances of the opinion being positively cited by other
federal courts.157
The question arises whether this association persists when
analyzing the extent to which other federal courts cite to first-tier
appellate opinions, whether analyzing citations in the aggregate (i.e.,
total number of positive citations) or disaggregated according to the
type of citing federal court. To answer the question, we implement a
variety of count regression models that analyze the 200 observations
in the first-tier database where a federal court positively cited to the
opinion issued by the BAP or district court.158 First, in order to predict
the aggregate number of positive citations, we conduct a zerotruncated negative binomial regression analysis.159 We then proceed to
analyze the number of positive citations by citing court type pursuant
to a negative binomial regression model (with one exception).160 For
both of these models, we incorporate the same independent variables
from the binary logistic regression model used to predict whether the
first-tier appellate opinion would be cited. Figures 7 and 8 compare (1)
the observed probabilities for each value of the number of positive
citations to the first-tier appellate opinions from the first-tier database
with (2) the average predicted probabilities of observing those specific

157. The model also identifies the Published, Dispute, and Subject variables as significant
predictors of whether the first-tier appellate opinion will have been cited by other federal courts.
158. There were actually 202 such observations. For purposes of our regression analyses,
however, we eliminated 2 extreme outliers, which left 200 observations to be analyzed. See supra
note 142.
159. A zero-truncated negative binomial regression model is appropriate here since (1) the
aggregate number of positive citations is a count variable that is overdispersed, and (2) there are
no zero values for this subset of observations (i.e., all opinions have at least one positive citing
reference).
160. We ran the regression model four times to account for four different types of citing
federal courts (i.e., bankruptcy court, district court, BAP, and extracircuit federal courts). In
order to predict the number of citing references by courts of appeals, however, we used a Poisson
regression model. When fitting a negative binomial regression model, the likelihood ratio test for
alpha—the overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chi-squared = 2.52, df = 1, p = 0.056),
thus indicating that the Poisson model is preferred. We do not use a zero-truncated model for
any of these dependent variables since some of the observations do have zero values.
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counts based on the actual values of all of the independent variables
included in the fitted models.
The models indicate that a statistically significant relationship
exists between the type of first-tier appellate court that issued the
opinion and the total number of positive citing references as well as
positive citing references by bankruptcy courts, BAPs, district courts,
courts of appeals, and extracircuit federal courts. A BAP opinion
increased the expected number of total positive citations over a fiveyear period by approximately 154% [84, 251], holding all other
variables constant. If we focus on the type of citing federal court,
holding all other variables at their mean, BAP opinions are predicted
to receive approximately (1) 2.0 [1.1, 3.0] more bankruptcy court
citations; (2) 1.3 [0.8, 1.7] more BAP citations; (3) 0.2 [0.1, 0.3] more
court of appeals citations; and (4) 0.6 [0.04, 1.2] more citations by
extracircuit federal courts.
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FIGURE 7
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED COUNTS OF
POSITIVE CITATION TO FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS
BY ALL FEDERAL COURTS AND EXTRACIRCUIT FEDERAL COURTS
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FIGURE 8
COMPARISON OF OBSERVED AND PREDICTED COUNTS OF POSITIVE
CITATION TO FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY TYPE OF CITING FEDERAL COURT
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These results support Hypotheses 2B, 3, 4, 5, and 7. We also
find that, holding all other variables at their mean, district court
opinions are predicted to receive approximately 0.34 [0.03, 0.65] more
district court citations than BAP opinions, thus confirming the
distinction we drew in Hypothesis 6.161 Overall, the bulk of our
evidence suggests that other actors within the bankruptcy judicial
system perceived BAPs to provide a better quality of appellate review
than district courts.162
161. To predict the total number of positive district court citations to first-tier appellate
opinions, we initially fitted a negative binomial regression model that included all of the
independent variables in the negative binomial regression model used for the other types of
citations (the full model). Although the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor in
the full model, the model as a whole was not statistically significant (chi-squared = 19.21, df =
12, p = 0.0836). Accordingly, using a backward-selection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial
model that only included the Court, Debtor, Subject, and Fiscal Year variables. This partial
model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 16.70, df = 5, p = 0.0051), and the Court
variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.032).
162. For detailed results from these regression models, see infra Appendix tbl.8.
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Using the same negative binomial regression model we used to
predict the extent to which federal courts would cite to the first-tier
appellate opinions, we find limited results for whether the type of
first-tier appellate opinion will be a statistically significant predictor
of the depth of treatment provided to the opinion by the citing federal
court when controlling for other factors.163 Again, when holding all
other variables at their mean, we find that BAP opinions are predicted
to have a statistically significant higher number of citing references by
other federal courts that (1) provided discussion of less than a
paragraph but more than a brief reference to the cited opinion—
approximately 2.96 [1.99, 3.92] more citing references of this type—
and (2) provided discussion of more than a paragraph but less than a
printed page of the opinion—approximately 0.39 [0.09, 0.68] more
citing references of this type.164 On the other hand, we find no
statistically significant relationship between the type of first-tier
appellate court that issued the opinion and the number of citing
references that either mentioned the opinion (i.e., contained a brief
reference to the cited opinion, usually in a string citation) or examined
the opinion (i.e., contained an extended discussion of the cited opinion
usually more than a printed page of text).165
Including the same observations and independent variables
from the regression models we used to predict the extent of citation
and depth of treatment by citing references, we predict through binary
logistic regression the tendency of first-tier appellate opinions to be
directly quoted by federal courts that positively cite to those opinions.
We find that, when holding other variables at their mean, a BAP
opinion is predicted to have a 64% [53, 75] chance of being directly

163. In one instance, we do not use a negative binomial regression model. In order to predict
the number of citing references that examined the first-tier appellate opinion (i.e., an opinion
that contains an extended discussion of the cited opinion usually more than a printed page of
text), we used a Poisson regression model since the values for this dependent variable were not
overdispersed. When using a negative binomial model, the likelihood ratio test for alpha—the
overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chi-squared = 0.0019, df = 1, p = 0.483), thus
indicating that the Poisson model is preferred.
164. To predict the total number of positive citations that provided discussion of more than a
paragraph but less than a printed page of the opinion, we initially fitted a negative binomial
regression model that included all of the independent variables included in the negative binomial
regression model used for the other types of citations (the full model). Although the Court
variable was a statistically significant predictor in the full model, the model as a whole was not
statistically significant (chi-squared = 15.41, df = 12, p = 0.2200). Accordingly, using a backwardselection stepwise regression, we fitted a partial model that only included the Court and Subject
variables. This partial model was statistically significant (chi-squared = 9.67, df = 2, p = 0.0080),
and the Court variable continued to be a statistically significant predictor (p = 0.008).
165. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9.
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quoted in contrast to 40% [29, 50] for a district court opinion.166 Thus,
when holding other variables at their mean, the likelihood of direct
quotation of a first-tier appellate opinion by a citing federal court is
predicted to increase by 25 [9, 40] percentage points when the court
cites to a BAP opinion. We present the distribution of predicted
probabilities for direct quotation (based on the actual values of all of
the independent variables included in the model) in Figure 9 below.
FIGURE 9
PREDICTED PROBABILITIES FOR DIRECT QUOTATION OF
FIRST-TIER APPELLATE OPINIONS BY CITING FEDERAL COURTS

15
0

5

10

15
10
0

5

Percentage of Opinions

20

BAP

20

District Court

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

0

.2

.4

.6

.8

1

Predicted Probability for Direct Positive Quotation

Moreover, if we look to the extent of direct quotation of firsttier appellate opinions, a negative binomial regression model indicates
that a statistically significant relationship exists between the type of
first-tier appellate court to have issued the opinion and the extent to

166. None of the other independent variables was a statistically significant predictor of
direct quotation of the first-tier appellate opinion by its citing reference. For detailed results
from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.11.
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which other federal courts directly quoted the opinion.167 Specifically,
we find that, holding all other variables at their mean, a BAP opinion
is predicted to have approximately 0.75 [0.35, 1.16] more citing
references that directly quote it than a district court opinion.168 These
findings support Hypotheses 9A and 9B.
Finally, we find support for Hypothesis 10, even when
controlling for other factors. A zero-truncated negative binomial
regression model indicates that the type of first-tier appellate court to
have issued the opinion influenced the immediacy with which it was
cited. A BAP opinion is predicted to decrease the expected number of
days before a federal court first cites positively to a first-tier appellate
opinion by approximately 44% [25, 58], holding all other variables
constant. It would seem, therefore, that BAP opinions command the
attention of other federal courts more quickly than district court
opinions.169
D. Interpretation of Results
Our inquiry into the perceived quality of appellate review has
focused on two types of perception: (1) the manner in which courts of
appeals, upon direct review, have perceived BAPs and district courts
to perform their error-finding function; and (2) the manner in which
other federal courts have signaled, through citation practices, their
perception of the quality of appellate review provided by BAPs and
district courts. We conducted our inquiry by testing a series of
hypotheses predicting that BAPs, by virtue of their structural
features, would be perceived to provide a quality of appellate review
superior to that of their district court counterparts. In the end, our
statistical analyses generate considerable evidence in support of our
hypotheses. We repeatedly find a statistically significant, positive
association between BAPs and various measures for the perception of
the quality of appellate review. However, as statistical significance
does not necessarily translate into substantive significance, we seek to
give a richer account of the different ways in which our results
buttress our claims.

167. The model incorporates the same independent variables and observations from the
binary logistic regression model used to predict the tendency for direct quotation of first-tier
appellate opinions.
168. No statistically significant relationship existed between any of the other independent
variables and the number of citations that directly quoted the first-tier appellate opinion. For
detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.9.
169. For detailed results from this regression model, see infra Appendix tbl.10.

NASHPARDO_PAGE

1804

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:6:1745

First, consider our findings that, even when holding other
variables at their mean, the likelihood of some affirmance (whether in
part or in full) by the court of appeals is predicted to increase from
77% for district courts to 93% for BAPs, and that the likelihood of full
affirmance by the court of appeals is predicted to increase from 69%
for district courts to 85% for BAPs.170 Given that affirmance deference
has been documented to be a major determinant of circuit court
outcomes,171 the statistically significant difference in affirmance rates
takes on added significance. While legal procedural requirements
generally require a court of appeals to accord deference to a lower
court’s findings of fact, the legal standard most often applicable to a
lower court’s conclusions of law—de novo review—calls for no such
deference. If courts of appeals affirm BAPs at a statistically significant
greater rate than district courts, notwithstanding the affirmance bias
created by legal review standards, our results suggest that the circuit
courts perceive the BAP to perform its error-finding function better
than the district court.172
Second, consider our statistically significant findings that BAP
opinions received higher numbers of positive citations by other federal
170. See supra Part III.C.1.
171. See CROSS, supra note 95, at 39–68.
172. A study conducted by the Federal Judicial Center found that courts of appeals fully
affirmed the judgments of district courts in bankruptcy appeals approximately 73% of the time,
and the study further estimated that the affirmance rates for BAP judgments would be similar.
See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 630. We conclude that our statistically significant
evidence contravenes the prior understanding of outcomes in the bankruptcy appeals system.
In response to the account we have provided regarding circuit court affirmance, one might
argue that courts of appeals simply prefer to reduce their workload and that they accordingly
tend to defer to BAPs (even if the legal standard calls for more exacting review). Assuming,
however, that the predilection toward leisure does not outweigh the desire of courts of appeals to
resolve appeals correctly, then one must assume that, to the extent that courts of appeals
affirm—and, on this story, defer to—BAPs more than district courts, they do so because they
believe that BAPs are structurally more likely to resolve the issues correctly than are district
courts. It is true that, to the extent that the courts of appeals simply defer to BAPs to a greater
extent on principle (i.e., with less review of how the BAPs actually resolve particular cases), we
cannot say whether the affirmance rate measures actual quality of appellate review. Even on
this story, however, the affirmance rate does measure the perceived quality of appellate review.
One also might argue that courts of appeals in BAP circuits are heavily invested in the
success of the BAPs given that the judicial councils in those circuits have decided to establish
BAPs in the first instance, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2000) (setting forth procedures for
establishing a BAP), and given that the judicial councils have also selected the bankruptcy
judges who will serve on the BAPs, see id. § 158(b)(3) (setting forth procedures for selecting BAP
judges). The desire to legitimate the BAP as an institution, in other words, may motivate the
greater tendency of courts of appeals to affirm BAPs. Insofar as review by a court of appeals is
transparent, however, it is unlikely that the court would simply affirm BAP judgments and
reasoning that were obviously wrong. Put another way, it seems unlikely that the desire of a
court of appeals to legitimate a BAP would entirely outweigh the desire to resolve appeals
correctly.
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courts, BAP opinions were cited in greater depth, and BAP opinions
were cited with greater immediacy. We noted above that citations
rates are most relevant and most informative in the absence of a stare
decisis obligation.173 Accordingly, we find that our results regarding
the citation practices of courts of appeals and extracircuit federal
courts merit particular attention.
At first blush, one might not consider substantively significant
our statistically significant finding that, when holding other variables
at their mean, BAP opinions are predicted to receive approximately
0.2 more citations by courts of appeals. Placed in its proper context,
however, this finding takes on new light. As an initial matter, courts
of appeals were incredibly parsimonious in their citing of first-tier
appellate opinions. Specifically, 82% of the first-tier appellate opinions
did not receive any circuit court citations, thus making any amount of
citation by the courts of appeals impressive. Furthermore, we estimate
pursuant to our regression analysis that the rate of citation over a
five-year period to BAP opinions by courts of appeals is 2.33 [1.30,
4.21] times greater than for district court opinions.174 These findings
confirm anecdotal evidence reported by the Federal Judicial Center
that circuit judges perceive BAP opinions to be of a higher quality
than district court opinions.175 Thus, although the size of the
statistically significant effect we witness with respect to circuit court
citations appears small, we interpret it to have substantive
significance. Finally, we uncovered statistically significant evidence to
support our hypothesis that extracircuit federal courts would
positively cite with greater frequency to BAP opinions—specifically, a
rate predicted to be 1.45 [1.03, 2.03] times greater than that for
district court opinions.176 In light of “the dearth of binding precedent
[on questions of substantive bankruptcy law] from the courts of
appeals or the Supreme Court,”177 one might interpret the extracircuit
favoritism of BAP opinions over district court opinions as the nextbest source of authority.
When we consider these findings in concert with the rest of our
findings on citation practices, we conclude that there exists strong
support for the notion that, in a variety of ways, other judicial actors
173. See supra notes 106–107 and accompanying text.
174. See infra Appendix tbl.8.
175. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 678 (“There is anecdotal evidence that
circuit judges find the BAP decisions they review better reasoned and the cases better prepared
for review than decisions from the district courts, and that this impression is independent of the
likelihood of affirmance or reversal.” (emphasis added)).
176. See infra Appendix tbl.8.
177. See McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 628.
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in the bankruptcy appeals process perceive BAPs to provide a better
quality of appellate review than district courts. These conclusions
provide strong validation to commentators who have theorized about
the ideal attributes of appellate review. To the extent that courts in
fact strive to resolve cases correctly, the findings suggest that BAPs in
fact offer higher quality appellate review than do district courts. That
conclusion, in turn, has important ramifications for policymakers. It
would seem desirable for policymakers to introduce more
multimember appellate tribunals staffed by judges with particular
expertise in the subject matter of the appeals.178
It is important to emphasize again that those conclusions
clearly result only if courts in fact strive to reach correct resolution of
cases and issues. That is a question on which our data do not and
cannot shed light. It may be the case that, partly as a result of
theoreticians’ writings, courts favor BAPs over district courts not
because they truly conclude that BAPs are correct more often, but
rather because they simply believe (without truly examining) that
BAPs are correct, which in turn inclines them simply to affirm the
conclusions of BAPs. If so, the lesson for policymakers is murkier.

178. See, e.g., id. at 634:
[U]sers of the complex bankruptcy system probably want precedent not just
settled, but settled right . . . . If early (and in the Ninth Circuit, not so early)
impressions about the quality of work by the bankruptcy appellate panels
hold up, the dual needs for binding authority and substantive correctness . . .
argue for some sort of a dual or hybrid system involving bankruptcy appellate
panels in some form.
The benefits of establishing such tribunals may impose various costs, although they may be
minimized depending on the manner in which such tribunals are integrated within existing
judicial operations. See, e.g., id. at 629; Bankruptcy Appeals, Lawyers Wary of New System Begun
This Month, N.Y.L.J., July 11, 1996, at 5 (“Steven Flanders, the Second Circuit Executive,
though, while noting that the BAPs represent a ‘major institutional change’ for the circuit,
believes the costs will be manageable. Mr. Flanders indicated that the calendaring of appeals
will be integrated into the circuit clerk’s office . . . .”). From the perspective of litigants, a cost of
particular concern would be that of disposition time. In the bankruptcy appeals context, however,
preliminary evidence tentatively suggests that BAPs appear to have reduced such costs. A study
by the Federal Judicial Center reported that, “[i]n most circuits, the overall mean and median
disposition times for BAPs are lower than the national figure for bankruptcy appeals to the
district courts, but in most circuits they are based on a rather small number of cases, which
limits the conclusions to be drawn from the figures.” McKenna & Wiggins, supra note 65, at 661.
We emphasize that our findings do not speak to whether it is more desirable to have many
such tribunals—as is the case with BAPs—or just one national tribunal—as is the case, for
example, with the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit for patent appeals.
That issue would seem to turn largely on the importance of having an intermediate appellate
tribunal announce legal rules with national uniformity. See, e.g., id. at 649.
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CONCLUSION
In this Article, we have shown that, in different ways, federal
courts have expressed a general preference for the quality of appellate
review afforded by BAPs as opposed to district courts. On the hardly
implausible assumption that courts in fact strive to resolve cases and
issues correctly, this finding tends to validate theoreticians’ claims
about the ideal attributes of appellate review, because BAPs, more so
than district courts, tend to feature those attributes. Upon the same
assumption, this finding also should prompt policymakers to introduce
more appellate tribunals with these attributes—specifically,
multimember panels whose members enjoy an expertise in the types
of matters likely to fill up the docket of the tribunals.
We believe that future research in the area will offer even more
insights. We intend to continue our exploration by refining our
consideration of issues that come before courts. Perhaps, for example,
some issues lend themselves more to solution by expert panels than do
others. We also hope to consider the effect of competition between
appellate tribunals, such as the one that exists between BAPs and
district courts in the bankruptcy appeals context.
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APPENDIX
Table 1: Sample of Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions
Panel A: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) Opinions by Fiscal
Year
Fiscal
Year

District Court
Opinions

Column
Percentage

BAP
Opinions

Column
Percentage

1998

56

34.57

34

32.08

1999

53

32.72

44

41.51

2000

53

32.72

28

26.42

Total

162

100.00

106

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
Panel B: District Court and Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions by Circuit
Circuit

Column
Percentage

BAP

Column
Percentage

Total

Column
Percentage

7

4.32

10

9.43

17

6.34

Second

32

19.75

5

4.72

37

13.81

Third

26

16.05

0

0.00

26

9.70

Fourth

9

5.56

0

0.00

9

3.36

Fifth

14

8.64

0

0.00

14

5.22

Sixth

16

9.88

11

10.38

27

10.07

Seventh

23

14.20

0

0.00

23

8.58

Eighth

2

1.23

22

20.75

24

8.96

Ninth

14

8.64

31

29.25

45

16.79

Tenth

7

4.32

27

25.47

34

12.69

Eleventh

12

7.41

0

0.00

12

4.48

District of
Columbia

0

0.00

0

0.00

0

0.00

162

100.0

106

100.00

268

100.00

First

Total

District
Court

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
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Panel C: Court of Appeals Opinions by Fiscal Year and First-Tier Court Reviewed
Fiscal
Year

Reviewing District
Court

Column
Percentage

Reviewing
BAP

Column
Percentage

1998

42

30.66

13

39.39

1999

44

32.12

9

27.27

2000

51

37.23

11

33.33

Total

137

100.00

33

100.00

Source: Second-Tier Database
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
Panel D: Court of Appeals Opinions by Circuit and First-Tier Court Reviewed
Circuit
First

District
Court

Column
Percentage

BAP

Column
Percentage

Total

Column
Percentage

3

2.19

3

9.09

6

3.53

14

10.22

2

6.06

16

9.41

Third

7

5.11

0

0.00

7

4.12

Fourth

8

5.84

0

0.00

8

4.71

Fifth

23

16.79

0

0.00

23

13.53

Sixth

15

10.95

2

6.06

17

10.00

Seventh

16

11.68

0

0.00

16

9.41

Eighth

10

7.30

2

6.06

12

7.06

Ninth

26

18.98

23

69.70

49

28.82

Tenth

8

5.84

1

3.03

9

5.29

Eleventh

6

4.38

0

0.00

6

3.53

District of
Columbia

1

0.73

0

0.00

1

0.59

137

100.00

33

100.00

170

100.00

Second

Total

Source: Second-Tier Database
Note: Column percentages may not total 100% due to rounding.
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Table 2: Frequency of Dispositions Rendered on Appeal
Panel A: First-Tier Dispositions
Disposition

Frequency

Percentage

Negative

78

29.10

Hybrid

22

8.21

Positive

168

62.69

Total

268

100.00

Disposition

Frequency

Percentage

Negative

33

19.41

Hybrid

17

10.00

Positive

120

70.59

Total

170

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database
Panel B: Second-Tier Dispositions

Source: Second-Tier Database
Table 3: Data for First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions with Positive Citing
References
Panel A: Frequency of Positive Citation to First-Tier Appellate Opinions
Number of
Citations

Frequency

Percentage

1

45

22.28

2

35

17.33

3

24

11.88

4

17

8.42

5

18

8.91

≥6

63

31.18

Total

202

100.00

Source: First-Tier Database
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Panel B: Distribution of Positive Citations to First-Tier Appellate Opinions
N

25%

Median

75%

Mean

202

1

2

5

4

Source: First-Tier Database

Table 4: Circuit Court Affirmance of First-Tier Appellate Dispositions
Panel A: Partial or Full Affirmance
Circuit Court Affirmance
First-Tier Appellate Court

No

Yes

Total

5
(8.77)

52
(91.23)

57
(100.00)

District Court

47
(26.11)

133
(73.89)

180
(100.00)

Total

52
(21.94)

185
(78.06)

237
(100.00)

BAP

Source: Affirmance Database
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test
with one degree of freedom is 0.006.
Panel B: Full Affirmance
Circuit Court Affirmance
First-Tier Appellate Court

No

Yes

Total

BAP

11
(19.30)

46
(80.70)

57
(100.00)

District Court

61
(33.89)

119
(66.11)

180
(100.00)

Total

72
(30.38)

165
(69.62)

237
(100.00)

Source: Affirmance Database
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test
with one degree of freedom is 0.037.
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Table 5: Citing Reference Data
Panel A: Federal Court Positive Citing Reference by Type of First-Tier Appellate
Opinion
Positive Citing Reference by Federal Court
First-Tier Appellate Opinion
Type

No

Yes

Total

10
(9.43)

96
(90.57)

106
(100.00)

District Court

56
(34.57)

106
(65.43)

162
(100.00)

Total

66
(24.63)

202
(75.37)

268
(100.00)

BAP

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test
with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001.
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Panel B: Citing Reference Data by Type of Citing Court for Positively Cited FirstTier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions
Citing References
Citing Court: All Federal Courts

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

6.00

7.27

94

District Court Opinions

2.00

3.25

106

Citing Court: Court of Appeals

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.45

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.19

106

Citing Court: Bankruptcy Appellate Panel

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

2.01

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.15

106

Citing Court: District Court

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.57

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

0.99

106

Citing Court: Bankruptcy Court

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

3.00

4.23

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.92

106

Citing Court: Extracircuit Federal Courts

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.50

2.52

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.51

106

t-test of difference in means: t = -6.5107 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -6.257 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = -2.7414 (p = 0.0067)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.560 (p = 0.0105)*

t-test of difference in means: t = -9.7270 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -9.368 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = 2.0821 (p = 0.0386)*
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 3.194 (p = 0.0014)**

t-test of difference in means: t = -5.2142 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.593 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = -3.0581 (p = 0.0025)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -3.337 (p = 0.0008)***

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Panel C: Citing Reference Data by Depth of Treatment for Positively Cited FirstTier Bankruptcy Appellate Opinions
Citing References
Depth of Treatment: Mentioned

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

1.10

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.73

106

Depth of Treatment: Cited

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

4.50

5.22

94

District Court Opinions

1.00

1.94

106

Depth of Treatment: Discussed

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.89

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.48

106

Depth of Treatment: Examined

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

0.00

0.05

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.09

106

t-test of difference in means: t = -1.8837 (p = 0.0611)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.288 (p = 0.0221)*

t-test of difference in means: t = -7.3435 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -6.941 (p < 0.0001)***

t-test of difference in means: t = -2.8311 (p = 0.0051)**
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -2.349 (p = 0.0188)*

t-test of difference in means: t = 1.0285 (p = 0.3050)
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 0.889 (p = 0.3741)
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Panel D: Federal Court Positive Quoting References by Type of First-Tier Appellate
Opinion
Positive Quoting Reference by Federal Court
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

No

Yes

Total

BAP

33
(35.11)

61
(64.89)

94
(100.00)

District Court

65
(61.32)

41
(38.68)

106
(100.00)

Total

98
(49.00)

102
(51.00)

200
(100.00)

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: Row percentages are reported in parentheses. The p-value from a chi-square test
with one degree of freedom is less than 0.0001.
Panel E: Citing Reference Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy
Appellate Opinions
Citing References
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

1.00

1.43

94

District Court Opinions

0.00

0.58

106

t-test of difference in means: t = -4.4839 (p < 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = -4.473 (p < 0.0001)***
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
Panel F: Immediacy Data for Positively Quoted First-Tier Bankruptcy Appellate
Opinions
Number of Days
First-Tier Appellate Opinion Type

Median

Mean

N

BAP Opinions

177

306

94

District Court Opinions

387

533

106

t-test of difference in means: t = 4.0459 (p = 0.0001)***
Wilcoxon rank-sum test: z = 4.166 (p < 0.0001)***
Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05.
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Table 6: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Circuit Court Affirmance
Variable

Affirmance

Full Affirmance

Court

3.947** (1.407, 11.069)

2.535* (1.119, 5.742)

Published

0.295** (0.129, 0.673)

0.287*** (0.138, 0.598)

Appellant

2.003 (0.815, 4.924)

4.293*** (1.886, 9.776)

Appellee

0.993 (0.434, 2.272)

2.372* (1.072, 5.249)

Chapter 7

1.594 (0.770, 3.299)

1.683 (0.852, 3.323)

Debtor Type

1.279 (0.581, 2.812)

0.936 (0.438, 2.000)

Dispute Type

0.940 (0.431, 2.048)

1.142 (0.544, 2.394)

Subject

0.596 (0.260, 1.365)

0.452* (0.206, 0.990)

FY 1998

1.103 (0.485, 2.511)

0.527 (0.247, 1.122)

FY 1999

0.721 (0.323, 1.611)

0.729 (0.336, 1.582)

N

237

237

Log likelihood

-110.133

-122.660

McFadden’s R²

0.117

0.157

Source: Affirmance Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses.
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Table 7: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Positive Citation by a Federal
Court to First-Tier Appellate Opinion
Variable

Positive Federal Court Citation

Court

3.445** (1.515, 7.836)

First-Tier Full Affirmance

1.459 (0.724, 2.942)

Published

6.810*** (3.391, 13.673)

Appellant

0.868 (0.361, 2.086)

Appellee

1.278 (0.524, 3.118)

Chapter 7

1.335 (0.644, 2.765)

Debtor Type

0.783 (0.321, 1.908)

Dispute Type

2.881* (1.148, 7.231)

Subject

3.392** (1.379, 8.346)

Subsequent Appeal

0.937 (0.450, 1.951)

FY 1998

0.745 (0.336, 1.653)

FY 1999

1.072 (0.469, 2.452)

N

268

Log likelihood

-116.625

McFadden’s R²

0.220

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses.
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Table 8: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing
References to Positively Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Type
of Federal Court)
Variable

All
Federal
Court
Citationsa

Bankruptcy
Court
Citationsb

District
Court
Citationsc

BAP
Citationsb

Court of
Appeals
Citationsd

Extracircuit
Citationsb

Court

2.538***
(1.836,
3.509)

2.072***
(1.509, 2.845)

0.628*
(0.410,
0.962)

9.702***
(5.462,
17.231)

2.336**
(1.297,
4.206)

1.447*
(1.030, 2.031)

First-Tier
Full
Affirmance

0.995
(0.732,
1.352)

0.985
(0.726, 1.337)

1.088
(0.738,
1.605)

0.873
(0.517,
1.473)

1.000
(0.716, 1.397)

Published

1.838**
(1.128,
2.994)

1.563
(0.968, 2.526)

4.276
(0.985,
18.561)

3.524
(0.820,
15.141)

4.814***
(2.443, 9.488)

Appellant

1.020
(0.685,
1.519)

1.023
(0.686, 1.527)

0.925
(0.573,
1.493)

1.381
(0.614,
3.104)

1.055
(0.681, 1.633)

Appellee

1.005
(0.681,
1.485)

1.096
(0.740, 1.623)

0.470**
(0.275,
0.802)

2.306*
(1.101,
4.830)

1.194
(0.780, 1.828)

Chapter 7

1.395*
(1.011,
1.924)

1.386*
(1.010, 1.904)

1.330
(0.873,
2.026)

1.629
(0.901,
2.948)

1.112
(0.783, 1.581)

Debtor Type

0.741
(0.490,
1.120)

0.782
(0.517, 1.183)

1.475
(0.803,
2.709)

0.400*
(0.188,
0.852)

0.800
(0.512, 1.249)

Dispute
Type

0.817
(0.551,
1.212)

0.796
(0.538, 1.178)

1.452
(0.871,
2.418)

0.678
(0.326,
1.413)

0.930
(0.614, 1.408)

Subject

1.435
(0.971,
2.121)

1.160
(0.783, 1.720)

1.870*
(1.125,
3.107)

1.341
(0.634,
2.838)

1.202
(0.797, 1.814)

Subsequent
Appeal

1.092
(0.795,
1.501)

1.063
(0.777, 1.455)

1.169
(0.789,
1.731)

0.949
(0.536,
1.682)

1.127
(0.805, 1.579)

FY 1998

1.134
(0.778,
1.652)

0.845
(0.584, 1.223)

1.687*
(0.999,
2.847)

1.657*
(1.018,
2.697)

0.700
(0.376,
1.302)

0.914
(0.606, 1.378)

FY 1999

1.004
(0.711,
1.418)

0.926
(0.659, 1.301)

1.324
(0.789,
2.223)

1.237
(0.799,
1.915)

0.447*
(0.240,
0.832)

0.867
(0.595, 1.263)

0.673
(0.432,
1.050)

1.492
(0.976,
2.280)
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Table 8 (continued)

N
Log
likelihood
McFadden’s
R²

All
Federal
Court
Citationsa

Bankruptcy
Court
Citationsb

District
Court
Citationsc

BAP
Citationsb

Court of
Appeals
Citationsd

Extracircuit
Citationsb

200

200

200

200

200

200

-473.506

-427.097

-238.131

-209.440

-130.134

-359.980

0.063

0.050

0.034

0.242

0.124

0.053

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses.
a
Zero-truncated negative binomial regression model.
b
Negative binomial regression model.
c
We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the
independent variables in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 161.
d
Poisson regression model. When fitting a negative binomial regression model, the
likelihood ratio test for alpha—the overdispersion parameter—was not significant (chisquared = 2.52, df = 1, p = 0.056), thus indicating that the Poisson model is preferred.

NASHPARDO_PAGE

1820

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:6:1745

Table 9: Regression Analyses of Number of Positive Federal Court Citing
References to Positively Cited First-Tier Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions (by Depth
of Treatment)
Variable

Citeda

Discussedb

Quoteda

Court

2.525***
(1.922, 3.317)

1.798**
(1.164, 2.779)

2.338***
(1.527, 3.580)

First-Tier Full Affirmance

1.023
(0.789, 1.325)

0.828
(0.561, 1.222)

Published

1.521
(0.997, 2.321)

1.535
(0.771, 3.056)

Appellant

1.127
(0.809, 1.569)

1.288
(0.761, 2.179)

Appellee

1.021
(0.735, 1.420)

1.373
(0.817, 2.307)

Chapter 7

1.352*
(1.027, 1.779)

1.302
(0.853, 1.988)

Debtor Type

0.766
(0.541, 1.085)

0.663
(0.388, 1.135)

Dispute Type

0.853
(0.608, 1.197)

0.913
(0.549, 1.517)

Subject

1.174
(0.839, 1.643)

Subsequent Appeal

0.915
(0.699, 1.197)

0.676
(0.438, 1.043)

FY 1998

1.101
(0.804, 1.506)

1.450
(0.885, 2.374)

FY 1999

0.969
(0.725, 1.296)

1.366
(0.862, 2.163)

N

1.397
(0.882, 2.213)

1.059
(0.645, 1.741)

200

200

200

Log likelihood

-436.214

-221.011

-257.881

McFadden’s R²

0.076

0.021

0.060

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses. We have only presented the results from those
regression analyses in which the Court variable was a statistically significant predictor.
a
Negative binomial regression model.
b
We have fitted a negative binomial regression model that does not include all of the
independent variables in the table for the reasons set forth in supra note 164.
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Table 10: Zero-Truncated Negative Binomial Regression Model of Number of Days
for First Positive Federal Court Citing Reference to Positively Cited First-Tier
Appellate Bankruptcy Opinions
Variable

Number of Days

Court

0.565*** (0.423, 0.753)

First-Tier Full Affirmance

0.913 (0.698, 1.194)

Published

0.922 (0.631, 1.345)

Appellant

1.116 (0.781, 1.595)

Appellee

1.097 (0.761, 1.582)

Chapter 7

0.767 (0.579, 1.016)

Debtor Type

0.889 (0.619, 1.275)

Dispute Type

0.836 (0.596, 1.174)

Subject

0.670* (0.480, 0.937)

Subsequent Appeal

0.681* (0.507, 0.914)

FY 1998

0.860 (0.607, 1.220)

FY 1999

0.927 (0.676, 1.272)

N

200

Log likelihood

-1392.339

McFadden’s R²

0.013

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Incidence rate ratios presented with 95%
confidence intervals in parentheses.

NASHPARDO_PAGE

1822

11/20/2008 1:19:14 PM

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:6:1745

Table 11: Binary Logistic Regression Model of Direct Quotation of Positively Cited
First-Tier Appellate Opinion by Positive Citing Federal Courts
Variable

Direct Quotation

Court

2.727** (1.393, 5.339)

First-Tier Full Affirmance

0.563 (0.297, 1.067)

Published

1.142 (0.455, 2.868)

Appellant

1.079 (0.473, 2.461)

Appellee

1.173 (0.514, 2.681)

Chapter 7

1.083 (0.555, 2.112)

Debtor Type

1.300 (0.572, 2.954)

Dispute Type

0.861 (0.381, 1.946)

Subject

1.050 (0.474, 2.328)

Subsequent Appeal

0.702 (0.360, 1.370)

FY 1998

1.079 (0.501, 2.323)

FY 1999

2.007 (0.964, 4.178)

N

200

Log likelihood

-126.033

McFadden’s R²

0.091

Source: First-Tier Database
Note: *** p ≤ 0.001, ** p ≤ 0.01, * p ≤ 0.05. Odds ratios presented with 95% confidence
intervals in parentheses.

